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ABSTRACT
In Search o f a Strategic Alternative
By
Michael J. Cole
University o f New Hampshire, September, 2013

The complex political landscape o f Iran is often excluded from political discourse,
contributing to oversimplified, at times incoherent policy approaches that reflect
fundamental misunderstandings and typically undermine rather than complement U.S.
nonproliferation objectives. Domestic receptivity to international inducements is
conditioned by specific characteristics o f the domestic political environment. Economic
sanctions have distributional effects that weaken moderate factions needed to pressure the
hardline constituencies of the regime. Coercive instruments have strangled Iranian civil
society, the private sector and the middle-class, severing crucial state-society networks,
leaving reformist forces vulnerable to the new wave o f hardline conservatism that has, in
spite of U.S. pressure, gained control o f the state apparatus since 2005. If external
pressure solidifies the radical faction’s political hold on power while weakening their
moderate competitors, the state will be less likely to embark on a course of
denuclearization.

Chapter I:

Introduction

Since 2001, the U.S., in conjunction with other members o f the international
community, has implemented twenty-eight separate forms of sanctions intended to
pressure the Iranian government’s commitment to a nuclear program (Kreps & Pasha
2012; 205). These measures include freezing financial assets, tightening export controls,
and the use o f coercive diplomacy; threatening the use o f military force should Iran cross
the established “red lines.” Though the U.S. relies heavily on the use o f sanctions as an
overall part o f their negotiating strategy, there is a weak causal relationship between the
economic and political pain inflicted by sanctions and forcing the target state, in this case,
Iran’s capitulation. As Richard Haass points out, “the problem with economic sanctions is
that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly
and even counterproductive” (Haass 1997; 75).
In terms of the effectiveness o f economic sanctions, only one question really need
be asked: are sanctions improving the target state’s compliance? Assessments on the
efficacy o f economic sanctions tend to omit data on whether those sanctions achieve their
specified goal. In this sense, these assessments take a selective view o f history.
According to Western diplomats, the goal o f the sanctions imposed on the Iranian state is
to change the calculations and behavior o f Iran’s leaders. This is not to assume that the
U.S., or other sender states are unitary actors. There may well be a diverse array of
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motivations and goals behind the imposition of sanctions on Iran, from inducing policy
change to weakening the state to provoke regime change. However, these motivations are
purely speculative. It is for this reason that this research bases its conclusions on what has
been officially stated as the purpose of economic sanctions, focusing on why, despite the
intense international economic and political pressure exerted on the Islamic Republic,
Iran’s acquiescence on the nuclear issue has still not been achieved.
According to the widely cited study from the Institute for International Economics
(HE), in which 116 cases o f sanctions from 1914 to 1990 were analyzed, broad sanctions- i.e. total and financial and trade embargoes—do not have a good track record o f
changing target countries policies or o f pushing them toward democracy (Bahrami &
Trita 2012). In fact, sanctions have a poor record o f influencing the behavior of states and
in many instances, have severely harmed the populations at large, particularly vulnerable
groups and democratic movements. At times it seems that sanctions are used for the sole
purpose o f placating the advocates o f a clenched fist, hardline policy toward Iran.
Supporters o f the sanctions policy toward Iran conflate the suffering of ordinary Iranian
people and civil society in general with the weakening o f the regime and its central allies.
“The real challenge or achievement o f economic sanctions is not the orchestration o f
economic pain, but the translation of it into effective leverage in a successful negotiating
strategy” (CFR 2012; 70). This seems nearly impossible given the atmosphere in
Washington that makes little distinction between the key player’s o f the conservative
establishment’s nuclear program and the more liberal, reform minded constituents
interested in restarting dialogue with the West. Mainstream U.S. media portrays the
Iranian regime as a homogenous political entity unified in its pursuit o f uranium
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enrichment and confrontation with the West. “Rationale and rationalization, systematic
presentation and symbolism, become so intertwined that it is difficult, even for policy
makers themselves, to disentangle reality from rhetoric” (Keohane and N ye 1989; 5). The
reality, as is often the case, is far less black and white than the hyperbolic appraisals that
inform the average American viewer. The complex political landscape o f Iran is often
excluded from public discourse, contributing to oversimplified, at times incoherent policy
approaches that reflect fundamental misunderstandings, typically undermining rather than
complementing U.S. objectives in the region.
An underlining theme in this work is that economic sanctions often create
unintended consequences that complicate achieving foreign policy objectives, as their
distributional effects tend to influence behavior in unanticipated ways. I argue that Iran’s
domestic receptivity to external sanctions and inducements is conditioned by specific
attributes o f the domestic political landscape -nam ely, the distributional impacts of
sanctions on different political coalitions (Solingen 2012; 11). This is an often
overlooked, albeit important, causal mechanism that shapes future policy concessions.
As this paper demonstrates, the impacts o f economic sanctions are distributed unevenly
across Iran’s political spectrum. “The sanctions regime has played into the hands of
groups with an interest in isolating the country from the global economy and thus making
denuclearization less likely” (Solingen 2013; 175). Thus, it is crucial that analyses take
into consideration how the domestic political environment conditions the incentive
structures o f the state’s elite coalitions. Economic sanctions scholar George Lopez (2000;
14) posits that a key weakness in the sanctions literature is that analyses tend to create a
misleading impression o f the ineffectiveness o f sanctions because they undervalue the
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broader political impact o f sanctions. The political implications o f sanctions are indeed
an important benchmark o f the policy’s success. In the case o f Iran, however, it is
precisely due to the broader political impacts that have been a detriment to the overall
success o f sanctions.
This thesis, therefore, focuses on the external and internal pressures that impact
Iran’s domestic political and economic environment and account for variations in the
government’s nuclear calculus. The distributional effects o f sanctions and positive
inducements among different actors play a large role in shaping the Iranian regime’s
decisions on the nuclear program (Nader 2012; 212). Selecting the form o f inducement
most appropriate in the context o f U.S. foreign policy goals depends a great deal on their
timing. Non-proliferation strategies that undermine the political leverage o f moderate
coalitions, such as negative inducements, will also undermine U.S. interests. The Iranian
political environment and the material incentives that shape each coalition’s political and
economic preferences are important considerations vis-a-vis the effectiveness of
sanctions. With a more precise understanding o f the domestic political processes of the
Iranian state, focusing particularly on the internal dynamics that shape Iran’s interaction
with the international community, and the complex factors that condition the policy
responses o f the regime’s various factions, this analysis illustrates why certain strategies
are more (or in this case, less) effective in inducing policy change.
This thesis argues that a primary reason for this outcome is that negative
inducements, specifically economic sanctions, have distributional effects that have
inadvertently weaken moderate factions needed to pressure the hardline constituencies of
the regime. In fact, sanctions imposed on Iran are largely responsible for the regime’s
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further entrenchment. While sanctions have done little to affect the regime’s overall
behavior, draconian sanctions have strangled Iranian civil society, the private sector and
the middle-class, severing cmcial state-society networks for the moderate forces in
Iranian politics. The result of which has left the reformist movement vulnerable to the
new wave of hardline conservatism that has, in spite o f U.S. pressure, gained control of
the state apparatus since 2005.
Thus, this thesis finds that coercive mechanisms imposed by the international
community have been ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst. Failing to
distinguish between potential allies and irreconcilable foes has endangered the reform
movement in Iran. Any possibility of opposition groups coalescing into a force potent
enough to initiate reforms is being severely undermined by indiscriminate comprehensive
sanctions on finance. In other words, sanctions have helped to weaken the very domestic
forces presumably required to leverage the power o f sanctions on the state and its hard
liner allies.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This thesis is an observational (small-n) study that applies multiple theories in the
field to substantiate the research findings. “Social scientists recognize small-n studies as a
distinctive form of empirical inquiry and an important design for the development and
evaluation o f public policies as well as for developing explanations and testing theories
o f political phenomena” (Johnson & Reynolds 2012; 197). This research relies on
analyses found in the academic research literature o f the field, speeches from both Iranian
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leaders and influential actors within the international community, elite interviews, non
profit think-tanks reports (e.g. RAND, ICG, ICAN et al.) and relevant documents relating
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
U.S. Presidential orders and United Nations Security Council resolutions. These
resources allow for a closer examination of the causal processes o f negative inducements
on the targeted regime.
It is difficult to analyze the numerous institutions, informal and formal networks,
and personalities that influence processes o f political change in Iran, given the opacity of
the decision-making and policy processes. Whether sanctions cause, or simply aggravate,
Iran’s economic predicament and the shift in its domestic environment are not conclusive
based on the available evidence. “Contemporary world politics is not a seamless web; it
is a tapestry of diverse relationships. In such a world, one model cannot explain all
situations” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 4). There are a plethora o f unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral measures simultaneously at work, which makes it exceedingly difficult to
establish a methodological framework to isolate the effects of one restrictive measure
over another. However, we can assess the aggregate effects o f the current sanctions
regime on Iranian willingness to limit their nuclear program. This thesis, therefore,
assesses the aggregate impact o f measures that have been imposed between 2000-2012.
The 2000-2012 time-frame selection is based on the stark change in the regime’s nuclear
strategy. Under the reformist government led by then-president Muhammad Khatami,
there was an unprecedented level o f cooperation between the U.S. and Iran reaching a
high point in 2003 when Khatami agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange of
economic and security concessions. However in 2004, the political climate changed, as
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did the regime’s willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue, which precipitated the
hard-line conservatives ascendency in Iran’s domestic politics.
In instances in which transparency is limited, as in the case o f Iran, a political
economy focus on outward versus inward oriented ruling coalitions can be helpful in
accounting for much of the variation in nuclear restraint across states and within states
over time (Solingen 2012). This thesis, therefore, is a qualitative political economy
analysis o f the elite coalitions o f the Iranian state. This thesis employs a political
economy framework to highlight Iran’s elite domestic coalitions, their access to power
and resources, their protected constituencies and bases o f support that may account for
variations in Iran’s nuclear policy. Subsequent chapters explain these variations by
employing the notions of elite coalition type and regime type. I find that the use of
negative inducements (threats o f war and economic sanctions) negatively impact Iran’s
level o f receptivity and willingness to cooperate on the issue o f uranium enrichment,
thereby working in a way counterproductive to U.S. policy objectives. In instances in
which introverted coalitions wield considerable formal and informal influence over the
state, as is presently the case, negative inducements may initiate a counterproductive
trajectory that jeopardizes the desired outcome.
Specifically, I show how two characteristics o f the domestic environment —
"coalition type" and "regime type"—help predict which form o f inducement is best suited
to change the calculations of Iran's leaders regarding the need for nuclear capacities.
Drawing on the work by Solingen (2012) and Kreps and Pasha (2012), if a ruling
coalition is introverted (groups opposing integration with the outside world) then it will
be less receptive to negative inducements. Furthermore, if external pressure solidifies the
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radical elite coalition’s political hold on power while weakening their moderate rivals,
then it is less likely that the state will embark on a course o f denuclearization.
This research adopts a comparative approach at the domestic level o f analysis,
focusing on the elite coalitions that comprise the Iranian state. The case studies used in
this research apply the theory o f the unequal, distributional impacts o f negative
inducements on elite coalitions in Iran. This thesis takes the Reformist movement as a
case study o f the distributional impacts on extroverted coalitions and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC) as a case on the introverted coalitions. Taken
together, these cases show how economic isolation and the weakening o f extroverted
political rivals benefits the radical right in Iran, facilitating its ascension within the
political and security bureaucracies o f the state. The inclusion o f these case studies in this
analysis is important because they represent the competing, albeit most influential
political voices within Iran and reveal the differentiated consequences o f negative
inducements on actors at both ends of the political spectrum. Together, these cases allow
for a more rigorous assessment o f the impact o f sanctions on the political, economic and
societal spheres of the state and why the results o f which may be at odds with their
intended purpose—changing the calculations o f Iranian leaders.
There are distinct advantages to using comparative case studies. They allow for
greater depth and description so that there is greater degree of conceptual clarity in
testing a theoretical framework. Instead o f looking at several features across numerous
cases, a case study examines numerous diverse features o f the case in greater depth
(Neuman 2012). For the purposes of this research, a case study method was chosen to
provide greater depth to the phenomena o f the distributional impacts o f sanctions that not
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only spillover into the political but the economic and social as well. The use of case
studies allows for the investigation of nuances lost when political processes are
generalized abstractions or numerical indicators (Fortna 2008).
As with every approach to social science research, qualitative case studies also
have shortcomings and weaknesses. This thesis focuses primarily on the state o f Iran, its
economy, society and principle actors. The extent to which these findings are
generalizable is contingent on replicating these research findings across other cases.
Therefore, it is not certain that the findings o f this research can be generalized to other
contexts without further analysis o f additional cases. Nevertheless, the framework for
assessing the effectiveness of sanctions applied here serves as a starting point for further
research in similar cases in which sanctions are imposed.
The essential theoretical argument presented in this thesis is twofold. The first is
that the domestic coalition’s economic orientation (“coalition type”) is an important
characteristic that helps predict the way in which a coalition will respond to external
pressure. In this case, if a coalition is introverted, such as the IRGC, then it w ill be less
receptive to negative inducements e.g. comprehensive or targeted sanctions and military
threats. The primary reason why the introverted coalition will be less receptive to
negative inducements is that sanctions, threats and segregation from the global economy
compliments their long-range political and economic goals and facilitates their
consolidation of power over domestic institutions. “Inward-looking leaders generally
oppose integration because their domestic support comes from the military-industrial
sector that depends on state subsidies, state bureaucracies themselves, and protected
industries” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 178). Introverted coalitions have a greater incentive to
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. maintain the status quo because external threats are used to justify an increase in military
spending, which creates more revenues to establish patronage and clientage systems, and
also justifies their institutional legitimacy and the repression o f their political rivals. In
Iran, threats o f war and economic sanctions have empowered hardline coalitions while
paradoxically weakening the domestic position o f moderate coalitions. It is clear that
sanctions produce differentiated consequences among the various actors in the domestic
context. This is precisely the reason why the distributional impact o f sanctions across
domestic actors must be accounted for when crafting inducements.
The impact o f the sanctions creates an ideal domestic environment for introverted
groups such as the IRGC, helping them consolidate their power over informal as well as
formal networks and institutions o f the state and society over the past decade. I argue that
military, economic or rhetorical threats (i.e. coercive diplomacy), strengthen coalitions
that stymie international economic integration, resist international regimes, and privilege
domestic industries, including the same nuclear program that outside threats hope to
undermine (Solingen 2012). Kreps and Pasha eloquently map the causal logic as to why
negative inducements strengthen introverts while undermining extroverts.

Negative inducements lead to-> a strengthening o f inward-looking
coalitions wary of integration into the global economy-> which deepens
their ability to strengthen monopolies, protectionism, import
substitution, and the military-industrial complex, including the nuclear
program. Conversely, these negative inducements-> undermine the
target state’s international environment and ability to attract foreign
investm ents these conditions undercut extroverted coalitions seeking to
integrate with the global economy-> thus, weakening domestic
proponents o f a more conciliatory nuclear policy (Kreps & Pasha 2012).
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The threat of military force plays into the narrative propagated by the radical coalitions,
and is instrumentalized to justify a prolonged state of emergency. M obilizing for external
defense is a customary strategy of the IRGC to rally their political base o f support and
consolidate formal control over domestic institutions. The utility o f an external menace to
keep Iran on war footing and distract the populace from the regime’s own economic
failings has long been a feature o f the Islamic Republic’s official discourse (Wehrey et al.
2009). “Standard diversionary theory argues that inter-state confrontation can improve
internal cohesion and result in a “rally” effect which boosts the leading coalition’s
political position” (Davies 2012; 323). Inflammatory rhetoric from the outside, direct
threats and the heightened state o f emergency caused, or at least justified by sanctions,
helps to cultivate a domestic political environment that is conducive to the expansion of
inwardly-oriented or introverted groups in nearly every aspect o f Iranian life and society.
Threats o f military force reinforce their threat narrative, which provides a useful
diversionary tactic to reorient public anger toward the outside. “This is particularly the
case if the inward-looking coalition has built its narrative around the idea that nuclear
weapons are an instrument for defending against unwanted international influence”
(Kreps & Pasha 2012; 178).
The second half of the theoretical argument also looks to the domestic
environment as it provides the context in which external inducements operate. The
domestic characteristic o f “regime type” also conditions the state’s response to external,
negative inducements. I argue that an authoritarian regime is less receptive to negative
inducements than a democratic regime. In an authoritarian context, leaders and
governments have many ways to insulate themselves, and designing “smart” sanctions to
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target only them is extraordinarily difficult (Haass 1997). Sanctions also have the
unintended consequence o f legitimizing a regime’s grip over the political and economic
spheres o f the state and provide a significant advantage in maintaining its power. A
domestic political environment in a state o f emergency or under siege enables the regime
to batten down the hatches in terms o f repressing oppositional and civil society
mobilization, diverting attention away from domestic troubles as well as necessitating
strict control o f the country’s vital resources. For example, “by creating scarcity,
[sanctions] enable governments to better control the distribution o f goods; and they create
a general sense o f siege that governments can exploit to maintain political control”
(Haass 1997; 80). This is especially the case for the IRGC, who, because o f their
pervasive influence in domestic politics, are well positioned to benefit from the structural
changes to Iran’s economy under sanctions. This dynamic closes off previously existing
opportunity structures for the reform movement to mobilize against the regime. In a
domestic environment that demands unity and punishes dissent, the oppositional voices,
in this case the Reformist coalition, are expelled from the corridors of power and
marginalized to the periphery o f domestic politics.
Thus, in the same way that the coalition type reveals the way in which a coalition
w ill respond to external coercion, the type o f regime, that is, the nature o f its domestic
institutions (authoritarian v. democratic) helps to predict how vulnerable the regime will
be to external pressure (Solingen 2012). A s the research presented below demonstrates,
autocratic regimes have an easier time mitigating the negative effects o f sanctions than do
democratic regimes. By diverting the pressure o f financial burdens away from the key
players of the regime and onto ordinary Iranians and its political adversaries, autocratic
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regimes can insulate themselves from the paralyzing effects of sanctions. Thus, sanctions
are not as effective on less transparent regimes.
Before moving on, I would like to briefly clarify a few terms key to the argument
presented in this thesis. An inducement, a mechanism that may induce someone to do
something, may be a positive incentive, or conversely, a negative punishment. When
using the term “negative inducements,” I refer to the collective impact o f both military
threats and comprehensive economic sanctions. The term, m odel fo r political survival
refers to an elite political coalition’s orientation for taking strategic decisions, interacting
with domestic and international actors and integrating with the global economy. In most
cases, coalitions represent a broad range o f interests and values that do not fit neatly into
any one categorization. In the interest o f clarity, however, one can posit the model o f
political survival as following between two ideal types: extroverted (internationalizing)
and introverted (inward-looking) perspectives.
Extroverted coalitions seek global economic integration and participation in
international institutions as a way to promote modernization and reduce uncertainty. As
Solingen (2012; 12) notes, “Internationalizing coalitions require political and economic
stability to reduce uncertainty and maximize access to foreign markets, resources, capital,
investments, aid, and technology.” In contrast, inward-looking coalitions reject the global
economy as an engine o f industrialization and moreover, “tend to emphasize economic
nationalism-sometimes dressed in rigid religious identities- casting ambitious nuclear
programs as tools o f modernization and symbols o f defiance against perceived dominant
global political and economic orders” (Solingen 2012; 11). As w e take a closer look at
the actors on Iran’s domestic stage, the implications o f each model o f political survival
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on the country’s nuclear position and interaction with the outside world w ill become
clearer.

Overview o f Chapter Contents

Cortright and Lopez (2000; 32) posit that the traditional criteria for assessing the
effectiveness of sanctions have been too narrow. This thesis attempts to broaden the
scope o f analysis to consider the social, humanitarian, political and economic impacts of
sanctions across the spectrum o f diverse actors in Iran’s domestic environment. There
must be greater focus on the internal dynamics o f the target state to assess the
differentiated impacts of sanctions on the elite actors o f the state and society. The media
tend to offer vague portrayals o f the Islamic Republic, depicting Iran as an irrational state
actor. “Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by “mad
mullahs” but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders”
(Waltz 2012; 4). Power and policy oscillate from moderate to fundamentalist, cooperative
to confrontational as diverse domestic coalitions operate in the context o f a highly
complex, fragmented political terrain. The intense factional rivalries in Iran, driven by
competing ideologies and visions, have shaped Iran’s economic and foreign policies since
the 1979 revolution. Conflating domestic polities under a general title o f radical or ‘evil’
misses the fundamental point that the incentive structure o f each domestic coalition and
faction is different, and therefore will likely respond differently to external influences
(Solingen 2012). “Although Iran’s leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric,
they show no propensity for self-destruction” (Waltz 2012; 4). Incendiary speeches made
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by Iranian leaders are primarily tailored for domestic consumption and should not be
considered a window into the real intentions o f the regime’s dominant actors. The
subsequent chapters map the domestic political landscape o f Iran to provide insight into
the country’s political complexity and eliminate some o f the misconceptions that
constrain outsiders’ abilities to engage in informed policy decisions.
Past studies have portrayed the Iran as an omnipresent structure or actor,
homogenizing extremely complex features o f the state. An appropriate metaphor for the
Islamic Republic is to think of Iran not as an apple, or one unitary, coherent actor, but as
a cluster of grapes. The grapes represent all the various political and economic groups
within Iran vying to assert their interests and ideology on the state. There are some grapes
that are larger and more developed than others and there are some grapes that are bruised
and fragile. Some may be highly interconnected while others exist on the periphery with
very few linkages at all. This situation is reflective o f the Iranian regime, which has been
divided since it was established in 1979.
The fragmentation o f Iran’s political landscape can be categorized into four
distinct coalitions or blocs, moving from political left to right; Reformists, Conservative
Pragmatists, Conservative Traditionalists, and Radicals (Neo-Principalists). In order to
establish a clear delineation between coalitions, this analysis divides these groups further
into the categories o f Islamic Left and the Islamic Right. This categorization is based on
the political preferences o f each coalition. Whereas the elite coalitions o f the Islamic Left
promote a more liberal society in which the controls on civil society are relaxed, the
Islamic Right adheres to the rigid principles of the Islamic Revolution and envisions a
religiously homogenous society with strict controls on society. The left-right dichotomy
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is more complicated in regards to their economic preferences. Whereas the Islamic Left
primary engages in a development-oriented economic strategy, the Islamic Right’s
economic approach is predicated on redistributive policies. Both the Islamic Left and
Right prefer domestic economic policies that are sympathetic to the statist economic left.
However, a clear distinction can be made in terms o f their relationship with the global
economy and their respective modes o f political survival-introverted v. extroverted. The
various Reformist groups and the Pragmatic Conservatives comprise the Islamic political
Left while the Islamic Right is made up o f the two aforementioned sub-factions: the
Pragmatic Traditionalists and the far-right, ultra-conservative Neo-Principalists. The
domestic environment in Iran can also be divided based on the three distinct epochs in
which each coalition held the reins of power: the Pragmatic Conservative era (19891997); the Reformist era (1997-2005); and the Neo-Principalist era beginning in 2005 and
continuing through to the present time (Safshekan 2010).
One major goal o f this thesis is to distinguish between the Iranian domestic
coalitions willing to bring about a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and those
groups who have an interest in escalating tensions and maintaining economic isolation.
Identifying each coalition’s ideological aims, constituencies, economic preferences, and
access to resources and power are the factors underpinning this distinction. Chapter II
assesses the distributional impact o f economic sanctions on the Islamic Left as well as the
urban middle class and civil society. I argue that the prospect o f fostering a counter
regime grassroots movement needed to pressure the regime is under threat because many
Iranian citizens are even more vulnerable, and thus, more dependent on the government
they wish to reform. Chapter III o f this analysis examines the distributional effects o f
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sanctions on the Islamic Right. I pay special attention to the ultra-conservative, hardliner
coalition, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and argue that negative
inducements facilitate their socio-economic and political expansion into Iran’s state and
security apparatus, as well as informal corridors o f power, accounting for their overall
contribution to the current nuclear stalemate. This chapter will focus on the ways in
which the hardliners—i.e. introverted coalitions—have been politically and economically
strengthened as a direct and indirect result of external pressure. The advocates of
weaponizing the nuclear program are presently benefiting from the economic isolation
brought on by sanctions because their power is derived from an introverted political
economy model which benefits from protectionism, strict import controls and the
removal of foreign influence. The Revolutionary Guards have been able to adapt to the
rapidly changing economic environment under sanctions because o f its privileged
position throughout Iran’s domestic political institutions. A s this dire situation persists
and continues to suffocate the reform movement, the probability o f Iranian capitulation
on the nuclear issue is less likely to occur.
The concluding chapter o f this thesis looks to strategic policy alternatives to
coercive diplomacy that could alleviate the confrontational atmosphere o f international
negotiations and put an end to the nuclear crisis. For negotiations to be effective, an
incremental process o f building trust and respect on both sides o f the table must be
initiated. This is easier said than done since the dreary history o f coercive diplomacy
shows that all too often, threats and promises undercut, rather than complement each
other (Jervis 2013). As it stands now, there are more domestic political advantages in
pursuing a policy of nuclear resistance in Iran than there are international incentives to
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cooperate. Support for Iran’s increasing level of nuclear resistance is evident in elite
speeches, interviews, the regime’s economic adjustment policies and the mere fact that
tensions still remain high surrounding the regime’s unwillingness to suspend its uranium
enrichment program. If there is any hope o f stalling the march toward war, there must be
greater effort to produce a negotiating strategy that is sensitive to Iran’s security
concerns, material incentives, internal dynamics and regional ambitions that could help to
put negotiations back on track and bring Iran back in line with its international treaty
obligations.
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Chapter II:

The Distributional Effects o f Negative Inducements on the Islamic Left

Domestic and regional environments shape the incentive structures o f elite
coalitions that comprise the state. Each coalition has preferences, interests and vantage
points that can be altered due to changes in the domestic and international political
environments. Power relations, bargaining among domestic groups and changing
international conditions shape state interests and policies (Karns & Mingst 2004).
Sanctions and inducements affect individuals (leaders, producers, consumers, rentseekers, and others) who respond to them in ways that shape collective outcomes
(Solingen 2012; 10).
This chapter begins by analyzing the moderate groups that comprise the Islamic
Left, and then examines how changing regional conditions and external inducements alter
their domestic position and ability to influence internal political outcomes. I argue that
the differentiated impact of negative inducements (e.g. threats o f military force) coupled
with economic sanctions have been deleterious for extroverted coalitions such as the
reform movement, the urban middle class and civil society groups in Iran. I show how the
groups most likely to push for cooperation with the West and internal democratization
have been economically marginalized, made more politically vulnerable, and found
everyday life more difficult as a result o f the sanctions regime. The problem with this
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type of broad-brush approach is that sanctions tend to affect the general population, while
those in government and the military are able to skirt the sanctions (Haass 1997; 79).

The Islamic Left

The Reformists are the most moderate faction in Iranian politics, essentially
representing the reorganization of the political left that emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s.
In 1988, moderate clergy members split from the Association o f Militant Clergy, Jameeh
Rowhaniyyat-e Mobarez, and formed the Society o f Militant Clergy, M ajma-e
Rowhaniyoun-e M obarez (Wehrey et al. 2009). The Islamic Left o f today is composed of
various reformist groups such as the pro-Khatami Islamic Iran Participation Front and
Mehdi Karroubi’s National Trust Party (Nader 2012; 217). The reformists represent the
internationalizing, extroverted model o f political survival. Though all political coalitions
in Iran subscribe to the concept of a theocratic state ruled according to the velayat-e
faghih i.e. rule of the supreme jurist, the political left favors a more developed and free
civil society, greater transparency and pluralism in the political system and integration
with the global economy to promote economic growth. “Though previously espousing
socialistic and statist economic policies, the Islamic Left has increasingly favored less
state control over the economy” (Nader 2012; 217). The most vital constituencies o f the
Reformist coalition include Iran’s intelligentsia (i.e. liberal writers and students), the
middle and professional classes, activist groups for women’s rights and other minority
rights as well as various other groups attempting to loosen the government’s control on
civil society.
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During the Reformist era between 1997-2005, there was an unprecedented degree
o f cooperation between Iran and its most fierce regional and international rivals. Former
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was also able to foster a much more tolerant
Iranian society during his tenure in the late 1990s. A 2004 World Bank report claimed,
“after 24 years marked by internal post-revolutionary strife, international isolation, and
deep economic volatility, Iran is slowly emerging from a long period o f uncertainty and
stability” (Nader 2012; 219). (Nearly a decade later, we now know that this optimism was
premature and short-lived.) Then-president Khatami introduced the notion of the
“Dialogue among Civilizations” calling for the normalizing o f relations between the
Islamic nations o f the world and the international community based on mutual respect
and common purpose. In addition, following the tragic events o f September 11, 2001,
Iran assisted the U.S. in the overthrow o f the Taliban government and committed over
$500 million in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic did, of course
have in interest in seeing the destruction the Taliban, since they were on the verge o f war
with the problematic Sunni extremist organization in 1997; nevertheless, this was
considered to be a break through in U.S.-Iran relations and the possible start to a new era
of mutual understanding and cooperation. In 2003, a remarkable breakthrough took place
during negotiations between Iran and members o f the EU 3 , Britain, France and Germany
in which Tehran agreed to suspend its nuclear program and voluntarily agreed to uphold
the additional protocol of the IAEA safeguard agreement. Ray Takeyh (2009; 247) points
out that Khatami’s suspension o f the program was not a cynical p lo y .. .it was a genuine
attempt to determine what Iran could gain in terms o f security assurances and economic
concessions for its voluntary act o f suspension.
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The hardliner factions, though politically marginalized at the time, vehemently
opposed many o f Khatami’s initiatives, especially the suspension o f the nuclear program
and sought out any opportunity to undermine his agenda. The Reform government’s
detractors claimed that Khatami and his allies were ‘tired revolutionaries’ who
abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution. Surprisingly, this courageous new
foreign policy ended up being severely undermined not by the competing coalitions
within Iran’s domestic landscape, but by careless accusations made by the Bush
Administration. During the January 29, 2002 State o f the Union address, George W. Bush
uttered a phrase heard around the world. Bush proclaimed that North Korea, Iraq and Iran
constituted the world’s “axis o f evil”, and stated that the destruction o f these regimes had
become a vital nation security interest. Shortly thereafter, National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice clarified the administration's position on Iran. "Iran's direct support of
regional and global terrorism," she said, "and its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed in the days after the world's worst
terrorist attacks in history" (PBS Frontline 2007). Following this diplomatic faux pas, the
streets o f Tehran were overflowing with enraged citizens condemning the U.S., giving
the conservative movement an opportunity to fan the flames and raise the country’s threat
perception. Thus, for the Reform government, it became extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to credibly promote dialogue with the West. By May o f 2002, Khamenei
openly dismissed the possibility o f diplomatic engagement and the brief glimmer o f hope
to restart relations between the U.S. and Iran was extinguished. “External threats make
the domestic economic objective o f broader integration more difficult, since the
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possibility of military force destabilizes the domestic economy and discourages foreign
investment” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 180).
Washington’s bellicose rhetoric damaged the reform movement’s reputation and
left them politically vulnerable to the hardliner coalitions, who framed Khatami’s policies
as weak and claimed that his faction were nothing more than puppets o f foreign regimes.
The combination o f Washington’s rhetoric and ensuing actions allowed the hardliner
factions back into the political mainstream. When the dust settled it became impossible
for the Reform agenda to gain traction with the conservative establishment, especially the
supreme leader. Without the allied support o f the supreme leader and his powerful
domestic coalition, the reform agenda stalled and soon after, Iranian citizens became
weary o f the moderates’ inability to effectively govern and enact the promised
institutional reforms. In a sense, the neo-conservative government in Washington helped
the rise of the neo-conservative coalition in Tehran.
These developments indicate how incendiary rhetoric (e.g. threats o f military
force) undermines the strength o f internationalizing or extroverted coalitions. The
reformers’ strength draws from the ability to promote economic linkages, which are far
more complicated in the face o f military force (Kreps & Pasha 2012). In the context of
the Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda o f regime change in Iraq and the
subsequent asymmetrical shift in power relations in the Middle East, Iranian leaders
became increasingly anxious regarding Washington’s intentions toward Iran. Far from
Iran lamenting the demise of Saddam Hussein, the speed at which he met his demise
lingered in the minds o f the clerical establishment, alerting them to their country’s
strategic vulnerability to the ambitious superpower. The recalculating of Iran’s strategic
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vulnerability on the part o f Iran’s clerical establishment is evident in the subsequent
change in attitudes toward the U.S. The ‘Axis o f Evil’ speech signified a dramatic turning
point not only in U.S.-Iran relations but also in the domestic balance o f power in Iranian
politics. The ripple effect of this development continues to influence the confrontational
context o f the nuclear debate today.
The second elite coalition represents the center o f Iranian politics. The
Conservative Pragmatists are a hybrid political faction that gravitates toward the
Reformists regarding matters o f the economy but is more conservative regarding cultural
issues. Economically, the Pragmatists subscribe to a top-down, ‘China M odel’ o f
modernization, arguing for increased financial and technical cooperation with the West
but not for greater democratization o f state institutions (Wehrey et al. 2009). “These
groups perceive little benefit from a policy o f nuclear assertion or ambiguity, both for
domestic and international reasons, and have been more amenable to relinquishing
nuclear programs that might place barriers to international economic access” (Solingen
2012; 13). The Conservative Pragmatists live up to their name as they often choose
pragmatism over ideological fervor and are, at times, willing to sacrifice revolutionary
prestige in favor of compromise. This bloc has, at times, reversed its position in domestic
affairs, which provoked criticism from both the moderates and the conservatives as being
political opportunists. This reflects the eclectic nature o f Pragmatists, representing a
diverse collection of interests and values. Their primary constituents are typically the
urban middle classes, bazaari merchants and former and current government technocrats.
The Conservative Pragmatists exhibit a composite model o f political survival, one that
includes internationalizing and introverted tendencies.
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Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, known as the saradar-e sazandegi or “generalissimo
o f reconstruction,” pursued pragmatic foreign policies so to help carry out his economic
agenda aimed at greater integration with the global economy. Under Rafsanjani, Iran
abandoned its efforts at exporting the revolution to other Shi’a states and improved
relations with Sunni-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani also garnered
support from technocratic officials in many of the state’s economic ministries who shared
his vision o f a more capitalist system o f Islamic rule. However, “the Pragmatists’ efforts
at economic reform were blocked by the Traditionalists, whose monopolistic control of
the economy would have been endangered by greater domestic and international
competition” (Nader 2012; 219). Despite the Pragmatists’ contribution to the
development o f Iran’s infrastructure following the devastating eight-year war with Iraq,
the benefits were not visible enough for the poorer classes as the general population
failed to see the oil money reach their dinner tables. It is for this reason that the Islamic
Right’s redistributive policies gained overwhelming support from the lower
socioeconomic, mral and urban classes in following years.
Since the Pragmatists are amenable to revisiting ineffective or harmful policies,
regardless of ideological affiliation, they could prove to be a crucial ally for the Reform
movement and its more moderate agenda o f resuming multilateral engagement.
Developing attractive incentives for cooperation presupposes awareness o f their interests,
however. Again, understanding the domestic political processes in Iran is the only way to
discover which actors may be more receptive to external inducements and willing to
return to negotiations than others. In order to bring about a more realistic possibility of
obtaining cooperation and a pathway to agreement on the nuclear question, it is important
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to address these moderate factions’ domestic pressures as well as their constituent and
institutional loyalties. Pragmatic and moderate coalitions w ill only support a cooperative
policy with the West only if cooperation is believed to be in their best interest and only if
it will strengthen their respective domestic positions.
The current sanctions regime that imposes conditions o f international isolation is
detrimental to these moderate groups seeking dialogue with the international community.
Extroverted coalitions, who draw their strength by creating economic interconnectedness
with the outside world and by providing conditions conducive to foreign investment,
have been pushed from the corridors o f power in Iran. The domestic costs o f negotiating
are rising as cooperating with the West is no longer a politically salient option. The new
generation o f financial sanctions has ostensibly targeted the various nodes that connect
Iran to the global economy. The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iran cause
significant decreases in private sector domestic production and sever reformist coalitions
from the political power traditionally derived from their economic activities and
associations with formal institutions.
The economic costs are clear. The fledging private sector is unable to import the
necessary raw materials for manufacturing and the banking sanctions are causing a virtual
standstill in imports and exports o f legitimate businesses (ICAN 2012). Prior to 2006
(between 1996-2006) and before the financial sanctions that froze Iranian assets were
imposed, over 6 million new jobs were created. According to former Iranian Central
Bank researcher Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, however, between 2006 and the present, zero
new jobs have been created and unemployment has risen to record highs. Meanwhile, the
government is expanding its reach into the private sector by privatizing former state
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assets and selling them to the regime’s closest allies, thus giving groups like the IRGC a
strategic economic advantage over its domestic competitors.

Unlike past sanctions, like the kind imposed on regimes such as Libya and
Iraq, which only focused on the ‘illegal’ transfer o f funds and money
laundering, the Iranian sanctions are not related to a specific sector or
industry nor to business entities or specific individuals. This economic
uncertainty due to sanctions is causing stagnation for the private sector,
while some businessmen point out that companies affiliated with the state,
e.g. IRGC, are exploiting the situation as they have access to government
exchange rates (ICAN 2012; 10).

The moderate coalitions are not only weakened economically, and thus politically, they
are losing a major aspect o f their power within civil society and the ability to exert
grassroots pressure on the regime. Social theorist Sidney Tarrow (1998; 88) notes that
reform is most likely when challenges from outside the polity provide a political
incentive for elites within it to advance their own policies and careers. In this case, these
challenges from the outside (i.e. economic sanction) are a detriment for the elites
pursuing reformist policies but have, however, created opportunities for the introverted
elites to thrive under the status quo. In the absence of counter-regime mobilization and
sustained collective action from the Islamic Left, pressuring the regime’s capitulation and
reform makes for a very unlikely outcome.

Constraints on Contention

Traditional analyses on the effectiveness o f sanctions (see David A. Baldwin)
have been confined to indicators o f economic and social deterioration and the subsequent
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political choices o f the target nation’s leadership (Cortright & Lopez 2000). Sanction
optimists hope or assume that sanctions w ill create sufficient pressure on the regime to
bring Iran to the negotiating table regarding its nuclear policy. “In this framework,
sanctions are supposed to exact political change that is directly proportionate to the
economic hardship experienced” (Cortright & Lopez 2000; 19). A s an International Crisis
Group report noted, “Behind the sanctions policy lies the hope that growing popular
discontent will confront the regime with a stark choice: altering its nuclear policy or
running the risk o f popular unrest” (ICG 2013; 31). However, sanctions are having a
long-term negative impact on the source o f societal change in Iran as they undermine the
ability to mobilize and affect internal reforms. In other words, sanctions are not only
failing to induce sufficient social pressure on the government to force a change in policy,
they are creating barriers to those very forces seeking reform. “B y reducing the scope of
independent action,” argued Haass, sanctions can work against forces promoting political
pluralism” (1997; 80). Specifically, the urban middle class that has historically played a
central role in creating change and promoting progress in Iran are key casualties of the
sanctions regime (ICAN 2012).
Civil society groups are rapidly losing influence in Iranian society. Volunteerism
is nearly impossible due to economic uncertainty caused by the rotating schedules of
escalating sanctions. “Sanctions and in particular, the limitations placed on the transfer o f
funds, has created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged in health and
medical services, education efforts, support for orphans and disadvantaged women and
children to carry out their work” (ICAN 2012; 7). Many o f these organizations have
ceased operations entirely.
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Furthermore, the confrontation with the West is making it difficult for grassroots
groups and urban protesters to criticize government policies for fear o f being accused of
treason. Debilitating sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric o f war elevates national
security concerns and further diminishes the state’s tolerance o f internal dissent (ICAN
2012). Any opposition to government policies is framed as tacit support for external
enemies under the auspices of reform.
Security challenges imposed by their own government already curtail civil
society’s ability to attend regional and international conferences. But the policies o f other
governments further complicate their lives (ICAN 2012). Unable to use international
banks to transfer funds or to obtain visas to travel abroad, activists, like all regular Iranian
citizens, are unable to access basic services that could perhaps be used to foment
solidarity between reform-minded individuals and organizations across the world.
“Activist groups, already facing harsh repression, have seen their limited financial
resources dry up; restrictions on the export o f communications technology from the U.S.
has severely hindered the flow o f information” (ICG 2013; 37).
The use o f external resources is crucial in building a movement that is able to
disseminate and frame its messages to millions o f people to encourage greater
participation and widespread support. Sidney Tarrow (1998; 124) claims, “the most
effective forms of organization are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted
local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations.” In
instances in which social networks are severed, so too is the ability to mobilize supporters
rapidly and exert pressure on the state through established institutions. Social movements
face great hurdles in sustaining confrontation with opponents, maintaining a broad
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support base, and containing fissiparous tendencies, and many thus simply disappear
(Tarrow 1998).
External resources, exposure, and attention can help sustain a mass movement.
Thus, just when contact with and solidarity from the outside world are most needed,
Iranians are faced with the greatest level o f isolation. A s an Iranian analyst concluded:

The domestic actors striving to change the behavior of the Iranian state, it
turns out, do not merely constitute unfortunate collateral damage. They are
the direct recipients of policies that deny them protective tools, leaving
them vulnerable to significantly more powerful entities which always find
ways to get around sanctions and access instruments o f repression (Fahri
2012b).

The practical downside to economic sanctions is that it weakens potential allies within
the target population. This poses several problems for the U.S. and for grassroots
mobilization against the Iranian leadership. First, it is difficult for sanctions to be
effective in the absence o f a so called “transmission mechanism” whereby civilian
suffering could translate into actual policy changes (Palkki & Smith 2012). The
elimination o f connective structures, such as the free flow o f information amongst civic
activists, has effectively undermined any hope o f translating the suffering o f the Iranian
population into a collective action scenario in which the regime would be openly
challenged. The reformist coalitions have been stripped o f their economic sources o f
support, and therefore, political leverage to pressure the regime and effectively represent
ordinary Iranians. Rising tensions with the U.S. and its allies and the subsequent punitive
measures imposed to bring Iran in line with its international treaty obligations creates a
prolonged state of emergency that prevents opposition groups from vocalizing their
disapproval o f the regime’s policies. In the absence o f the extroverted coalitions’
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economic influence, the patronage system o f government elites has been able to deflect
much o f the anger emanating from the population, which has largely protected the regime
from social upheaval. In addition, civic organizational structures and networks have
dissipated as financial resources have evaporated. It is in this way that economic
sanctions are weakening civil society actors, reform-oriented members o f Iranian society,
democratic and women’s groups, supplanting their influence and ability to engage in
contentious politics.

Humanitarian Costs o f Coercive Diplomacy

Policy-makers consider sanctions to be a preferable non-violent alternative to less
diplomatic methods o f coercion. However, there are hidden costs to this strategy that
appear less like diplomacy and more like economic warfare. The banking sanctions that
were implemented in December 2011 have wreaked havoc on ordinary Iranian citizens to
an unprecedented extent, which has numerous unintended consequences on the already
fractious landscape o f Iran’s domestic politics. A majority o f Iranians (56%) say
U.N./U.S. sanctions have hurt Iranians livelihoods a great deal. Separately, 48% say
sanctions have affected their own personal livelihoods a great deal (Gallup 2013).
According to Iranian economist, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, from 2006-2011, zero new jobs
have been created for the middle classes. The unemployment rate for women is now over
30% while men experience 20-25% unemployment. The Iranian youth have been hit the
hardest: 30% of men 18-25 years o f age are unemployed while over 50% o f women in the
same age group are struggling to find work.
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UN Security Council sanctions on Iran (S /R E S /1696,1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803,1835 (2008), 1887 (2009) and 1929 (2010) creates food shortages, soaring prices
on public goods and services, exacerbates economic, political and social instability, as
well as heightens the sense of injustice that Iran is treated unfairly by the international
community and the United States in particular. According to a report by the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the W est’s sanctions regime against Iran
contributes to shortages o f humanitarian goods by disrupting the supply chain from
foreign manufacturer to the Iranian patient in need of medicine (USIP 2013). “Reports of
widespread shortages of specialized medicines for cancer patients, hemophiliacs and
individuals suffering from diabetes, multiple sclerosis and other serious conditions are
numerous” (ICG 2013; 34).
According to a December 2012 Gallup poll, thirty-one percent o f Iranians rated
their lives poorly enough to be considered “suffering,” one o f the highest rates in the
greater Middle East and North Africa region (Gallup 2013).1 Countries with similar
“suffering” rates are typically war-torn areas such as Afghanistan, Syria, and sub-Saharan
African states. Prices of basic food, clothes, and electronic goods have soared as a result
of international sanctions and a plummeting currency; the rial has more than halved in
value over the past year. Nobody believes the official figure o f 24% for the annual rate of
inflation (Economist 2012a). “To be sure, there are signs o f public anger related to the
economic downturn. Much criticism is directed at the regime, but there are also
indications that the West increasingly is blamed for what is viewed as a form of
collective punishment” (ICG 2013; 31). According to that same 2012 Gallup Poll, only
1 Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted Dec. 16, 2012Jan. 10, 2013, in Iran. For results based on the total sample o f national adults, one can say with 95%
confidence that the maximum margin o f sampling error is ±3.8 percentage points.
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around 10 per cent of the population holds the Iranian government accountable for the
economic downturn. “People do not necessarily see a correlation between an increase in
the price o f domestically produced goods and sanctions. So they blame the government.
But shortages of medicine have changed the dynamics, and people increasingly blame the
West for their predicament” (ICG 2013; 31).

Conclusion

As this chapter has showed, despite conventional wisdom, sanctions tend to be a
blunt instrument, the effects o f which spillover beyond the target government and onto
the civilian population. Sanctions assessments seem only to focus on areas in which
government institutions and sectors are directly affected, however, these reports tend to
completely omit the devastation imposed on Iranian citizens and the reformist clusters of
its civil society. It is obvious that sanctions hurt economies but it’s important to consider
who, specifically, gets hurt. Economic sanctions are not an alternative to war but are
rather tantamount to war. In essence, sanctions constitute a form o f collective punishment
levied against an entire population, indiscriminate of potential allies and vulnerable
segments of the population. Comprehensive sanctions against Iran are too broad to
impact the behavior o f the government. Instead they target the population. As Haass
noted:
The danger inherent in broad sanctions-beyond missing the true target- is
both moral, in that innocents are affected, and practical, in that sanctions
that harm the general population can bring about undesired effects,
including strengthening the regime, triggering large scale emigration, and
retarding the emergence o f a middle class and a civil society (Haass 1997;
79).
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The U.S. has a strategic interest to maintain a good relationship with the Iranian people.
“Ordinary Iranians are suffering from policies o f confrontation on which they have never
been consulted” (Economist Aug 18 2012). A relaxation on financial restrictions may, in
fact, open up a safety valve for democratic and reform movements to re-establish
operations in civil society and regain some o f the waning support o f the population by
solidifying its previous system o f patronage in urban centers. Further reliance on
economic sanctions will continue to produce unintended consequences that will
inevitably complicate the actualization o f its stated goals.
Khatami’s reformist government demonstrated to the world that Iran could
moderate its foreign policy and balance its nuclear ambitions in the context o f its
additional goals, such as integration into the global economy. Iran’s willingness to
suspend its nuclear program was instead met with threats o f regime change from
Washington, dramatically altering Tehran’s strategic calculations, threat perception and
its domestic balance o f power.
Current non-proliferation strategies via economic sanctions have created
conditions in Iran that are counterproductive for extroverted domestic coalitions and
reform-oriented civil society organizations, often viewed as the catalysts o f collective
action. Financial restrictions and the severing o f connective structures in formal and
informal networks contribute to the demise o f the groups needed to engage in collective
action to force the regime’s capitulation. The financial embargo imposed on ordinary
Iranian citizens has severely limited their ability mobilize, organize and exploit
opportunities to exert pressure on the regime. In their absence, the ultra-conservative
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coalitions have asserted their hegemony over the economic, political and societal
institutions of Iran, relegating their reformist counterparts to near irrelevance.
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Chapter III:

The Distributional Effects o f Negative Inducem ents on the Islamic Right

Negative inducements, both economic and rhetorical, have produced different
outcomes across the spectrum o f actors on Iran’s domestic stage. Segregating Iran from
the global economy presents opportunities for some groups while encouraging the demise
for others. The distributional impact o f negative inducements upsets Iran’s fragile
political environment, manipulating the balance of power between factions in favor o f
introverted coalitions. As a result, the elite coalitions associated with the state are less
receptive to negotiations and cooperation, creating a whole new set of unintended
consequences that complicate the nuclear standoff. In this sense, “issuing threats may
make for good politics but not necessarily good strategy” (Kreps & Pasha 2012; 207).
This chapter posits that introverted coalitions thrive under conditions of economic
isolation. The Revolutionary Guards, in particular, have a clear economic interest in a
sanctions regime that imposes conditions o f international isolation. This chapter begins
by highlighting the domestic actors that comprise the Islamic Right. The latter half o f this
section traces the ensuing internal developments in Iran that contribute to the
Revolutionary Guards’ hegemony over the economic, political, security and societal
institutions o f the state.

The Islamic Right
36

The Conservative Traditionalists represent the largest political faction within the
Islamic Republic, dominating the regime’s unelected institutions since its creation. Their
reach extends into nearly every major political and security institution o f the state, from
the Office of the Supreme Leader down to the Iranian parliament, the M ajlis. The
Traditionalists possess primary control over the most important political institutions in
Iran, including the Guardian Council, which has the authority to vet and ban political
candidates from elections, and the Assembly of Experts, the organ that selects the
Supreme Leader. The Traditionalists, like other coalitions with introverted characteristics,
value national independence as Iran has a long history of foreign intrusions into its
domestic affairs. As Foreign Minister o f Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, commented in a 2012
interview, “The most valuable commodity w e have - and w e cherish it and hold it very
strongly - is independence. And this is the price we have been paying for the past thirtythree years” (Rahimi 2012). The Traditionalists advocate strict cultural purity, national
self-sufficiency and robust controls on civil society.
The Traditionalists also possess a monopolistic grip on the economy, which
affords them unrestricted access to resources and unregulated discretion. Article 44 o f the
Islamic Republic’s constitution upholds the idea o f a centrally planned economy in which
the state sector wields control over large-scale industrial sectors as well as foreign trade,
banking, insurance, power generation, telecommunications; the “mother” industries. State
domination over the economy is one major reason why the regime is able to offset the
pain of economic sanctions onto unprivileged domestic groups and why authoritarian
regimes are better equipped than democracies to survive external economic pressure.
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“Leaders of authoritarian regimes are able to redirect external pressure onto isolated or
repressed social groups while insulating and protecting itse lf’ (Cortright & Lopez 2000;
20). Despite unquestionable hardship, the government- also the single most important
economic actor and sole dispense o f petrodollars- enjoys myriad tools to avoid economic
meltdown” (ICG 2013; 26). For example, rentier states can survive without traditional tax
bases because o f the lucrative income that comes with exporting natural resources, in this
case, oil. The economic structure o f the Iranian economy may influence the effectiveness
o f external instruments through varying audience costs o f authoritarian v. democratic
regimes. “Leaders incur audience costs such as the removal from office or no-confidence
votes-when they renege on their own public commitments” (Solingen 2012; 17). Since
the regime is generally able to operate independent o f its society (little taxation means
little representation), Iranian leaders are not as concerned with or sensitive to audience
costs. “Because domestic audiences can organize politically to overcome collective
action problems and are endowed with the legal authority to remove leaders from office,
democratic leaders are expected to be more vulnerable to audience costs than nondemocratic leaders” (Solingen 2012; 17). With respect to the expectation o f social
change, according to Cortright & Lopez (2000; 20), there is no assurance that a
sanctioned population will redirect the pain o f external coercion onto political leaders and
force a change in policy, especially with the authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian
settings, such as Iran, the elites who are often the targets of the sanctions regime are in
the best position to control economic activity and the allocation o f scarce resources
(Cortright & Lopez 2000). It is precisely because Authoritarian regimes have a greater
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array o f instruments at their disposal to retain social control and allocate scarce resources
that they are the most difficult to sanction.

The Rise o f the Radicals

Changing political winds have ushered in an era o f conservative political
hegemony that has created strong institutional and bureaucratic pressures on the regime
to maintain a hardened nuclear posture that ensures tense relations with the West. The
Supreme Leader and the Office o f the President both draw considerable support from the
IRGC, which has an interest in continuing confrontation with the U.S. (Davies 2012).
While the ayatollah’s power was previously based on the authority o f the clergy and a
complex web o f factions and institutions, today it is increasingly based on the IRGC:

By the time Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ascended to the position o f
Supreme leader, Iran’s internal balance o f power began to change.
Former allies o f the clerical establishment did not appear to be reliable
legitimating sources for the new leader, who was originally a junior
cleric from the city o f Mashhad, bereft o f significant theological
credentials. Possibly to compensate for this, the new Supreme Leader
cultivated a long term relationship with the armed forces from the
earliest days o f the revolution, and the IRGC was the greatest
beneficiary o f the change in leadership (Wehrey et al. 2009; 80).

The Conservative Traditionalist’s impetus for developing nuclear technology is tied to
the perception that the nuclear program increases its domestic legitimacy, supports its
regional ambitions and provides an important deterrent against meddling and foreign
interlopers. “Much like North Korea, Iran’s nuclear program constitutes an important
pillar o f the regime’s survival and even political legitimacy” (Nader 2012; 211). Another
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aspect o f Khamenei’s nuclear calculus is based on pragmatic considerations, as giving
ground to the West on the nuclear program could potentially alienate the Ayatollah and
his Conservative Traditionalist faction from the guardians of the revolution, the IRGC.
The supreme leader is far from convinced that the benefits o f dealing with the
enemy outweigh the potential pitfalls posed by declining revolutionary prestige and a
possible injection of “hedonistic” Western values into Iranian society (Economist 2013).
Under present conditions, the domestic costs o f abandoning the nuclear program
outweigh international incentives currently on the table. For the supreme leader, political
survival would be impossible without his praetorians. The ayatollah’s camp, the
Conservative Traditionalists, maintain a precarious, albeit necessary partnership with the
ranks of the Revolutionary Guards. The 2009 uprising undermined the image of the
Supreme Leader as living above the political fray, making him a target for political
backlash. The IRGC’s support comes at a high price for Khamenei. Alfoneh (2010; 74)
suggests, “in return for its assistance against reformist groups such as the Green
Movement, Khamenei has had to bribe the IRGC with political, economic, and even
ideological influence.” The waning power o f the Supreme Leader coupled with the
ascendancy of the Revolutionary Guards has culminated in a domestic political
environment in which a defiant nuclear posture is politically expedient.
Although the Office o f the Supreme Leader sits atop the official Iranian
governmental hierarchy, it is the Neo-Principalist faction that has become the most
influential political, economic and social coalition driving policy choices and collective
outcomes within Iran. The Radicals or the “Neo-Principalists” are the faction most
closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is only when
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the IRGC transcends its institutional limits and seeks power as a political actor through
the principal political institutions (i.e. M ajlis, and the presidency) that we can speak of a
Neo-Principalist faction (Safshekan 2010). The political group encapsulating this “new
conservative” current includes the Developers o f Islamic Iran or Abadgaran-e Iran-e
Islami, which was composed o f IRGC and Basij war veterans (Wehrey et al. 2009; 16).
The Revolutionary Guards’ role was traditionally confined to upholding the ideals
o f the Islamic Revolution with an implicit mandate to protect the conservative
establishment from external as well as internal enemies. Article 150 o f the Iranian
constitution clearly articulates the role of the IRGC, which intentionally divided power
between the clerics and the IRGC officers. It has since undergone a fundamental
evolution, becoming a largely autonomous political and econom ic actor that continues to
gain both formal and informal influence, rivaling even the Supreme Leader’s political
coalition. The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized
political system, in which the president, much o f the cabinet, many members of
parliament, and a range o f other provincial and local administrators hail from the ranks of
the IRGC (Wehrey et al. 2009; xi). Though there continues to be cleavages among the
ranks o f the IRGC, many in the Majlis (parliament) identify with the faction known as
Osulgarayan, the main bloc o f conservatives often referred to as “principalists,” which
encompasses the supporters o f Ahmadinejad as well as unaffiliated conservatives
(Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani 2011).

Talk o f “working together” and “unity” has permeated the language o f
the conservative and hardline politicians who are currently running Iran.
This language is not meant to extend to reformist o f even centrist
politicians who have been essentially purged since the 2009 presidential
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election, but it does indicate a closing o f ranks among an even narrower
circle o f politicians (Farhi 2012a; 3).

Veterans o f the IRGC have maintained a presence in all eight Majlis sessions; however,
their presence was formerly confined to single digit representation from 1980-2004. After
2004, the Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in politics grew to unprecedented levels,
when IRGC veterans won at least 16% percent o f the 290 seats (Boroujerdi &
Rahimkhani 2011; 2). The newly established political clout o f the IRGC officer corps has
a visible impact on Iran’s foreign policy and its domestic political landscape. Overall, the
numbers o f parliamentarians with IRGC pedigrees at least doubled between elections in
2000 and 2008 (Boroujerdi & Rahimkhani 2011).

The Political Economy of the Right

Economic sanctions are forcing the restructuring o f the Iranian economy. The
strategic placement o f IRGC officers throughout the regime’s influential ministries has
helped the IRGC comer opportunities opened up by this restructuring. “As is often the
case with sanctions, members of the elite with greatest access to the regime and state
privileges are best positioned to survive and even thrive in the new environment” (ICG
2013; 33). The status quo imposed by the international community aids the IRGC’s
monopolization of key economic sectors and the displacement o f foreign and domestic
competitors (Wehrey et al. 2009). Comprehensive sanctions and the restrictions on
foreign imports undercut the economic clout of Reformist and Pragmatist factions who
rely on international businesses to export the resources necessary for manufacturing. The
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Revolutionary Guards have an economic preference to resist integration with the global
economy because increased foreign competition would threaten their monopolistic grip
on lucrative industries and markets. The architects o f the nuclear program, the
Revolutionary Guards, have all too eagerly filled the power vacuum left in the wake of
the failing, legitimate enterprises o f the moderate coalitions. Kreps and Pasha posit that
shifts in ownership o f capital flows substantiate the claim that external threats strengthen
introverted coalitions and weaken extroverted coalitions (Kreps & Pasha 2012). “Private
businesses have suffered especially under sanctions. Meanwhile economic clout is
concentrated in the hands of a small elite, linked to the Revolutionary Guard, which
enjoys access to cheap foreign exchange and a virtual monopoly over imports”
(Economist 2013; 37). In Iran, the near destruction o f the private sector caused by
sanctions has strengthened and expanded the state-controlled segment o f the Iranian
economy (Bahrami & Trita 2012). In the absence o f competition from both international
and domestic corporations for public contracts within Iran, the Revolutionary Guards
filled that void by purchasing contract bids essentially uncontested. In 2010, for example,
“the IRGC purchased fifty percent plus one o f the shares o f the Telecommunications
Company of Iran (TCI) from the government for roughly $8 billion- the largest trade in
the history o f the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)” (Alfoneh 2010; 76).
The regime embarked on a massive policy to privatize important public assets to
decrease the level of government spending in the face of economic sanctions. Khamenei
had to first reinterpret Article 44 o f the Iranian constitution to legally circumvent the
provision mandating centralized control over the economy. These efforts at privatizing
public assets represent the expansion o f the regime’s foremost allies into unprecedented
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areas of the economy. The clerical establishment’s prominent position in the institutional
hierarchy enabled them to disqualify rival companies o f the Islamic Left from
consideration based on arbitrarily justified “security concerns”. This strategy, to give but
one example, allowed the IRGC-controlled companies, Toseeh-ye Etemad-e Mobin
Consortium and Mehr Eghtesad-e Iranian to compete for the TCI bid uncontested.
With the privatization o f assets estimated to be worth roughly $120 billion, the
Iranian leadership expanded from relatively transparent parts o f the public sector to parts
o f the public sector shielded from public scrutiny (Alfoneh 2010). “For all intents and
purposes, this makes the privatization o f TCI a handover o f publically owned enterprise
to the Revolutionary Guards...yet another calculated step in the organization’s campaign
to dominate the Iranian economy” (Alfoneh 2010; 77).
The Revolutionary Guard’s silent coup o f the Iranian economy also extends into
the country’s most lucrative industry, the oil and gas market. The government of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted its control over the oil and gas sector,
reducing the power o f the “oil mafia,” dominated by allies o f former President Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani (Mohamedi 2013). Enterprises associated with the Islamic Left have
been replaced with companies most associated with the Revolutionary Guards. Economic
sanctions curtailed the flow of direct foreign investment to domestic markets, devastating
legitimate Iranian businesses and essentially eliminating foreign competition from the
Iranian oil and natural gas sectors. For example, the Khatam al-Anbia (or gharargah
sazandegi khatam alanbia- abbreviated as Ghorb), the IRGC’s most visible construction
arm, has strengthened its role throughout the Iranian economy, including the oil and gas
sector, specifically within the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company
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(NIORDC). In recent years, Iran’s oil ministry signed over billions o f dollars worth o f
no-bid government contracts such as the $2.5 billion contract to finish the final phases of
the South Pars oil field. The Khatam al-Anbia, became the single largest recipient of
government contracts over the past four years, often bypassing the bidding process
completely (Safshekan 2010) and being awarded more than 750 contracts in various
construction, infrastmcture, oil and gas projects (Wehrey et al. 2009; xv). A s one of the
few institutions with the capacity to undertake massive public-works projects, the IRGC’s
construction contracts helped them build an extensive patronage network in rural areas.
“The IRGC may calculate that any dissent or blowback over its growing business profile
and illicit profiteering will be offset by the networks o f patronage and clientage that it has
built with a myriad o f companies” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 66). The IRGC’s role in spurring
rural economic development through public-works projects affords it a clear opportunity
to build a base o f rural support that can counterbalance any opposition from more urban,
entrepreneurial classes, the primary constituents o f the reformist and pragmatic factions
(Wehrey et al. 2009).
As a result, the IRGC now functions as an expansive socio-political-economic
conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner o f Iranian political life
and society (Wehrey et al. 2009; xi). The subsidiary wings of the IRGC are dedicated to
ideological outreach efforts via media and education programs, think tanks, youth camps
etc. and affords the organization popular support in municipal and national elections.
Much o f the Revolutionary Guard’s institutional legitimacy is predicated on these efforts
at ensuring the ‘cultural defense” o f the country which bolsters public support for the
aging ideals of the revolution.
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The Guards are further able to make good on their redistributive promises to the
public by using their privileged access to economic institutions that operate in the
informal sector o f the Iranian economy, beyond the purview of regulators. Iranian
religious foundations, or Bonyads, function as informal avenues through which
Revolutionary Guards can exert ideological influence over Iranian society. Bonyads were
originally established through the expropriation o f the Shah’s former assets that evolved
into massive conglomerates with the capacity to serve the ideological and cultural needs
of Revolutionary forces. They operated as religious charitable organizations assisting in
the reconstruction efforts following the Iran-Iraq war but now have the additional
function of solidifying a system o f patronage to those loyal to the revolution. The
Revolutionary Guards use of Islamic foundations, bonyads, as a means to extend its reach
into the Iranian economy and society, enabled the introverted coalitions to counterbalance
any political pressure from reformist groups in urban areas.
The use o f these foundations provides segments o f the ruling apparatus with
potent patronage tools to purchase loyalty and protect core constituencies (ICG 2013).
“Their major functions were to implement the promises made under a populist social
safety net parallel to formal social security” (Saeidi 2004; 498). They now operate as
massive conglomerates shielded from public scrutiny, as they are not legally obligated to
disclose economic and accounting information. Bonyads operate as [para]
nongovernmental organizations in a murky pseudo-public [cooperative] sector o f the
Iranian economy away from the public eye. The bonyads, which account for as much as
30-40 percent o f Iran’s economy, are not accountable to the executive or legislative
branches o f government.. .Many bonyads are controlled or staffed by current o f former
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members o f the Revolutionary Guards (Nader 2012) such as Bonyad Mostazafan
(Foundation o f the Oppressed) and Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of
Martyrs and Veterans Affairs).
One o f the largest and wealthiest bonyads, the Imam Reza Shrine Foundation, is
controlled by Khamenei’s loyal acolyte, Ayatollah Vaez Tabbasi and is estimated to have
accumulated as much as $15 billion through automobile manufacturing, real estate and
agriculture (Nader 2012; 215). Bonyads represent the dual power structure in Iran that
reinforces the financial authority o f religious leaders without accountability (Saeidi
2004). These ideological outreach efforts and control over vital state resources translate
into tangible political gains for the Revolutionary Guards, co-opting the clerical
establishment’s clientage and patronage networks and becoming the de facto state in rural
areas. “The commercialization o f the IRGC has the potential to broaden the circle o f its
popular support by co-opting existing financial elites into its constellation o f subsidiary
companies and subcontractors” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 55). This translates into a larger,
diverse demographic of Iranian society in which the Guards are able to exert influence
and counter any reformist opposition. “Sanctioned states with substantial resources, such
as oil-rich Iran, are in a position to redistribute among factions and sectors, buy off
critics, and pay more for what they need” (Stein 2012; 54). This enabled the IRGC to
transform into a multidimensional actor with vast institutional reach, extending into the
Iranian economy, government and society.

The Black Market

Outside o f its declared enterprises, the IRGC is reported to control an
underground shadow economy o f black-market goods, smuggled into Iran via illegal
jetties and other entry points that it alone controls (Wehrey et al. 2009; xv). The blackmarket economy is a major source o f revenue for the architects o f Iran’s nuclear program.
The IRGC manipulate the sanctions by leveraging control over the black market to
benefit its protected constituencies. Leaders advancing inward-looking models shield
favored constituencies including protected industries, military-industrial enterprises, state
bureaucracies, the under-employed, and segments of the population that are highly
dependent on states subsidies and military procurement (Solingen 2012).
In addition, the Revolutionary Guards circumvented many o f the most
economically damaging effects o f sanctions as their revenues are essentially left
unscathed by the sanctions regime. There is evidence, albeit anecdotal, that these
informal networks are the channels through which Iran is able to export its commodities.
The revenues earned from illicit trading are used for the acquisition o f advanced
weaponry, the development o f nuclear research programs and the general expansion of
military-industrial spending within Iran. The Guards have a clear, vested interest in the
nuclear program’s ultimate success, especially in the face o f U.S. and international
pressure that strengthens its domestic position. There are parallels between the hard-line
elites’ control over the black-market economy in Iran and in the former Yugoslavia. “In
the former Yugoslavia, hard-line militia groups used their control o f border checkpoints
and transportation routes to enrich themselves and consolidate political power” (Cortright
& Lopez 2000; 22).
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The IRGC’s vast networks penetrate strategically vital state institutions and
important jetties such as the Martyr Rajai Port Complex, which allow them to control
trafficking operations, unimpeded by government interference. The IRGC is estimated to
yield a 200-300 per cent profit on illegal sales. “One M ajlis member recently stated that
the IRGC black market activities might account for up to $12 billion USD per year”
(Wehrey et al. 2009; 67). Other reports claim that, “smuggling is booming as clandestine
networks are increasingly replacing commercial ones...Sm uggling networks are
becoming an integral part o f the shadow economy that reportedly accounts for 21 per cent
o f GDP” (ICG 2013; 37). The Revolutionary Guards harness their control o f these
informal networks to facilitate their economic and political expansion. The importance of
the hardliners’ expansion o f control over the state’s economic, political and security
bureaucracies cannot be overstated as this trend has undoubtedly caused Iranian domestic
politics to shift to the political right.
The immediate implications o f this development is that the black market is
fostering the rise of informal power structures for introverted coalitions and contributing
to the lack of accountability and transparency in the Iranian economic and political
system (ICAN 2012). Economic isolation forces many Iranians to rely more heavily on
these informal sources of power, empowering the conservative establishment and its
protectors. In effect the banking sanctions are forcing massive reliance on a cash based
economy, making already vulnerable Iranians dependent on black-marketeers for the
transfer of funds to cover educational, health or other legitimate costs o f living. As
ordinary Iranian’s cash savings lose value due to inflation and the currency collapse, they
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rely more and more on the government, on the well-connected elites within its
institutional hierarchy, and on black-market enterprises dominated by radical coalitions.
The government’s use o f a multiple exchange rate has helps the regime manage
the pain o f sanctions while giving discounted rates to foreign exchange to its close allies.
Members of the Revolutionary Guard exploit their privileged access to cheap petro
dollars because o f their connections with the state. “At the end o f 2011, after a run on the
currency, officials fixed the exchange rate at 12,260 rials to the dollar to help importers
(Economist 2013b; 51). For those unfortunate enough not to have government
connections, the exchange rate is around 24,368 rials to the dollar. This creates a massive
black-market demand for cheap foreign exchange, which gives the introverted coalitions
a significant strategic economic advantage over its domestic competitors and accelerates
its dominance over imports and other vital industries and markets in the Iranian economy.
The growing economic and political power of the IRGC certainly increases its
sense of political privilege and entitlement, the consequences o f which ultimately equate
into a hardline stance on the nuclear program. Forcing Iranians to move toward a cash
economy reduces transparency and creates a greater source o f illicit trade in the Persian
Gulf and thus produces more income for military-industrial conglomerate, the IRGC. The
lack on financial transparency and accountability into Iran’s inner economic workings
undoubtedly empowers and supports the IRGC’s many illicit activities, as well as its
control o f a shadow economy. As Wehrey et al. (2009) argue:

As an economic organization more interested in monopoly rather than
open competition, the IRGC may wish to keep Iran’s economy closed o ff
and under its tight control. Under these circumstances, U.S. and
international sanctions may not weaken the IRGC, but instead enhance its
formal and illicit economic capabilities (Wehrey et al. 2009; 71).
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The IRGC’s goal is to continue its social, political and economic expansion within
Iranian society. The most expedient means of achieving this goal is resisting foreign
influence, maintaining tension with the West and remaining isolated from the outside
world. The cacophony o f negative inducements imposed on Iran introduces a domestic
trend in which the radical coalitions thrive. According to Kreps and Pasha (2012; 197),
for Iran “increased spending on its military-industrial complex along with decreased
investment and trade freedom (a result o f financial sanctions) following the issuance of
negative inducements point toward an inward reorientation o f its government and
dominant elites.”

Conclusion

Negative inducements (threats o f war and comprehensive sanctions) have the
aggregate effect o f heightening Iran’s sense o f insecurity. Negative inducements,
including bellicose rhetoric from U.S. and Israeli leaders, inadvertently manipulate the
domestic coalition balance of power in Iran and lessened the political-economic obstacles
for the IRGC’s rise to power. Iran’s sense o f insecurity is instrumentalized by the IRGC
as their raison d’etat for developing the nuclear program despite the rising costs o f doing
so. A cursory glance at a map o f the post 9/11 Middle East reveals Iran’s precarious
security situation. Iran is surrounded by unstable and/or hostile governments, U.S.
warzones, allies and military bases and an other nuclear powers such as Israel,
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unrestricted by the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) or any o f the international institutions
currently demanding Iran’s compliance.
Since 2006, the increasing number of punitive measures imposed on Iran has only
served to convince growing numbers o f the population o f the W est’s malicious intent,
igniting their revolutionary ardor for sacrifice and resistance. Sanctions create a siege
mentality that justifies a prolonged national state o f emergency in Iran, making it easier
to protect Islamist right constituencies, suppress dissent and divert attention away from
governmental failings (e.g. economic mismanagement o f the Ahmadinejad
administration). Politicizing the nuclear crisis is part and parcel o f the IRGC’s larger
strategy o f igniting their base o f support, legitimizing their institutional mandate as
providers o f the ‘sacred defense’ for the country and most importantly, keeping their
coffers full. As Davies notes, “U.S. attempts at economic isolation have given the Iranian
government a plausible scapegoat for internal economic problems” (2012; 324). Threats
have perpetuated Iran’s sense o f strategic vulnerability and made it easier for Iran’s
Islamist right to justify a more radical foreign policy agenda, in which nuclear
proliferation served as their primary tool to guarantee the country’s defense. As analyzed
in the previous chapter, the state of emergency also constrains domestic competitors that
may otherwise interfere with the political and economic campaign o f the IRGC.
With autonomous private enterprise in demise and the expansion o f the IRGC into
newly-privatized industries, the IRGC expanded its patronage networks and charity
operations. “Whether real or exaggerated, this threat perception has had the effect o f
deepening and broadening the IRGC’s populist and mobilizing outreach into virtually
every geographic, economic, and societal sector o f Iran” (Wehrey et al. 2009; 32). With
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more and more people becoming dependent on the state for basic goods and services,
hardliner groups have sought to replace the once vital civil society organizations,
augmenting the scope of conservative influence in impoverished rural and urban areas.
Forcing ever increasing numbers of Iranian citizens to become dependent on the
economically stable IRGC for survival removes countervailing power centers that
potentially challenge their hegemony. According to Arthur Stein (2012; 53), sanctions
become problematic only when the sanctioned state does not have market power and
must obtain the acquiescence o f others. This is not the case in Iran, as the state-controlled
segments o f the pseudo-public sector currently flourishing are controlled by groups
associated with the IRGC, providing introverted coalitions with additional mechanisms to
manage the economic pain of sanctions. This is one instance in which “broad economic
sanctions not only intensify pressure on politically weak groups, but enables the target
government to manipulate the effects o f sanctions to benefit their supporters and
constituencies” (Bahrami & Trita 2012).
The popular notion that isolating Iran from the international community will
eventually persuade its leaders to become better global citizens must be revisited.
Increasing Iran’s isolation will continue to provide opportunity structures for the
introverted, hardliner groups to protect their economic interests and w ill therefore
strengthen their clenched grip on the formal and informal decision-making apparatus of
the state.

Sanctions can be economically effective and politically self-defeating
when they exact economic pain but serve to strengthen the sanctioned
regime. This occurs both because the state increases its power relative to
society and because the factions supporting the state are strengthened
relative to those opposed to it. There is no small irony and tragedy in the
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ability of sanctions to impose greater costs on a sanctioned regime’s
opponents than its supporters (Stein 2012; 47).

As the concluding chapter will emphasize, despite conventional wisdom, diplomacy
coupled with military threats and instruments used to damage the Iranian economy are
not compatible. Introducing positive inducements such as reintegrating Iran into the
global economy could possibly undermine the introverted coalition’s protectionist
economic policies and disrupt its formidable patronage networks, creating new
opportunity structures for the moderate coalitions to exploit. Loosening the broad-brush
sanctions and thus, removing the convincing threat narrative may reverse the current
trajectory and provide an additional avenue o f pressure that can be exerted on the regime
and stymie the political expansion of the hardliner coalition.
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Chapter IV

Towards a Strategic Alternative:
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions

There are many misconceptions in Washington regarding the relative
effectiveness o f sanctions that have immense implications on the course o f negotiations.
Washington currently finds itself at a crossroads; interpreting sanctions as a success may
prompt policy makers to remain patient and wait for the optimal moment when the
Iranian economy is on the verge o f collapse so to get the best deal from the Iranian
interlocutors. Conversely, measuring Iran’s overall economic performance may indicate
that despite the hit to the Iranian economy, the dominant factions o f the Islamist right are
finding ways to adjust to the impact o f sanctions, which would, in turn, harden the
Iranian’s negotiating position.
Mainstream analyses tend to present Iran’s economic predicament as a ‘zero-sum
game’ in which Iran will either succumb to U.S. demands or continue to absorb the
pressure. What this mode of analysis tends to obscure is how sanctions are absorbed by
Iran’s political elite in a continuous and dynamic fashion (Yong & Hajihosseini 2013).
From an international relations theory perspective, a neo-realist approach to assessing the
impact o f sanctions is inadequate because it assumes that states are unitary actors. N eo
realists tend to discredit the domestic level o f analysis, asserting that it is not particularly
useful in determining whether sanctions are “working” or not. However, assuming that
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the state actors constitute one cohesive polity leads to oversimplifications regarding the
distributional impacts of negative inducements and to what extent they impact the
motivations and interests of the influential actors o f that state. Different pressures and
opportunities exist for each actor and must be taken into consideration to effectively
assess the role o f one measure over another. Reorienting the analytical focus o f sanctions
assessments from the system level to the domestic level o f analysis is the way in which
this research contributes to the discipline as a whole.
The distributional effects o f sanctions among different actors w ill play a large role
in shaping the Iranian regime’s decisions on the nuclear program (Nader 2012; 212).
Changing the nuclear calculations of the clerical establishment necessitates a policy that
is sensitive to the dynamic and fractured political environment in Iran, and takes into
account which policies will empower the moderates or undermine the ultra-conservative
belligerents. Recognizing possible cleavages and potential points o f leverage between
actors requires an understanding o f the internal workings o f the Iranian state as well as an
awareness of elite coalitions’ material incentives that influence their calculations and
behavior. It is for that reason that this research employed a political economy focus on
the elite coalitions in Iran and their access to the resources and power o f the state.
Though the realist theoretical perspective itself is insufficient in analyzing the
impact o f sanctions on the domestic environment o f the targeted state, realist thinkers
such as Kenneth Waltz come to similar conclusions regarding the overall ineffectiveness
o f comprehensive sanctions. The inclusion o f theorists from multiple disciplines in
international relations theory is not to suggest inconsistency in the theoretical framework
o f this research. It suggests that there are a growing number of academics coming to
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similar conclusions, albeit for different reasons, regarding the consequences of economic
sanctions. The ineffectiveness o f sanctions in terms o f achieving their stated objective
transcends the traditionally drawn lines of political theory.
This thesis has found that two variables in the domestic environment, “coalition
type” and “regime type”, mediate the impact of comprehensive sanctions and threats of
war (i.e. negative inducements). In the case o f Iran, negative inducements are weakening
the Islamic Left while strengthening the political legitimacy and economic clout of the
Islamic Right. In previous chapters, I discussed how negative inducements displace the
more moderate traditional elites in both the political system and the economic structure o f
Iran. The use of military threats shift the domestic balance o f power between elite
coalitions that strengthen introverted factions, enabling their further control over
important ministries o f the state and the trajectory o f Iran’s foreign policy. The sanctions
imposed on Iran create a siege mentality that supports the threat narrative o f the clerical
establishment, enabling them to justify and frame economic pain as a revolutionary
sacrifice and repress oppositional voices under the guise o f national security. The regime
uses nationalistic sentiments to strengthen the resolve o f an otherwise war-weary
population, deflect criticism, and improve internal cohesion. The pervasive influence of
hard-line factions on the political and economic institutions of the state allows them to
adapt to the dynamic Iranian economy that is constantly adjusting to the impacts of
sanctions. As these extroverted players are marginalized, the IRGC not only fill the
economic vacuum they leave behind, but also continue to gain their political influence as
well (Alfoneh 2010). In addition, the humanitarian crisis produced by economic sanctions
will continue to alienate larger numbers of ordinary Iranians and make it increasingly
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difficult for moderate factions within the government to justify an improved relationship
with the U.S. and the rest of the international community. Policies that accept that Iranian
citizens merely constitute a form o f collateral damage may lead more and more
vulnerable citizens into the arms o f the conservative and radical coalitions, further
marginalizing the reform movement and its agenda. In the absence o f moderate voices
within the Iranian political hierarchy, there will be little hope o f exerting the pressure on
the regime, translating civilian suffering into tangible policy change or witnessing a
change in course on the Iranian side o f the nuclear issue. These factors ultimately impact
Iran’s level o f receptivity to external pressure and willingness to cooperate in regards to
nuclear proliferation, further emboldening the Iranian regime and its allies to resist
external pressure regardless of the mounting costs. The following section brings together
lessons from past non-proliferation success stories and the implications of the current
non-proliferation efforts on the prospect o f reaching a diplomatic solution to the nuclear
crisis. These cases lend support to the claim that comprehensive sanctions are
disconnected from their stated policy objectives and in various instances, escalate
tensions to the point that war must inevitably follow.

Lessons from Other Cases

Over the past 60 years, there have been a few nuclear non-proliferation success
stories such as, Taiwan, and South Korea. A key lesson can be extrapolated from these
success stories. As J.I. Katz o f Washington University points out, one cause of
nonproliferation success was democratic transition combined with a security guarantee
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from a dominant power that removed the strategic necessity for an independent nuclear
force, as was the case for South Korea (Katz 2008). Thus, this case highlights an
important condition for the success o f non-proliferation initiatives: the need for security
assurances and reform. This logic is strikingly absent from the current non-proliferation
strategy toward Iran. I have already analyzed how the current sanctions regime is
weakening the economic and political power of moderate factions, urban middle classes,
and civil society groups that would be expected to push for further democratization in
Iran’s political system. This is not to assume that in the absence o f negative inducements
democratization would occur but rather under the current circumstances, the groups most
likely to support democratization and reform are unable to exert sufficient pressure on the
regime to induce policy change. In addition, instead o f removing the strategic necessity
for a nuclear deterrent, U.S. rhetoric and action similarly proved to Iran that it is under
threat by a superpower. The strategic environment o f the Middle East following the U.S.
incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan provided a greater degree o f security for the Islamic
Republic. The U.S. military intervention in Iraq supplanted Saddam Hussein’s Sunni
Baathist regime and replaced it with a Shi’ite-controlled government. The Taliban, Iran’s
Sunni rival to the East, was similarly removed from power and replaced by another U.S.allied regime, that o f Hamid Karzai. The removal o f Iran’s closest strategic threats to its
East and West similarly removed the need for a nuclear deterrent. However, it was
Washington’s veiled threats toward Iran following the 2002 State o f the Union speech
that forced Iran’s leaders to recalculate their strategic position in the Middle East in
relation to the newly assertive rogue hegemon. Thus, it was the actions o f Washington
that convinced Tehran of the strategic necessity o f a nuclear deterrent.
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We can also ask what lessons can be learned by U.S. participation in sanctions
regimes against other Middle Eastern states, namely Iraq and Syria. There are substantial
differences between Iraq, Syria and Iran, geographically, politically, economically as well
as the factors that warranted the use o f sanctions. The sanctions themselves were also
applied through different mechanisms. The sanctions against Iran and Iraq, for example,
were implemented within the United Nations Security Council framework whereas the
sanctions levied against Syria were exerted through U.S. executive orders. However,
there is an overriding commonality between the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian cases that is
worth consideration. In all of these instances, there has been a fundamental disconnect
between the stated objectives o f economic sanctions and what actually takes place within
the target country. This perilous gap between proposal and practice has been responsible
for dramatic loss of life, the deterioration o f living standards within the target countries
and the overall worsening of the conditions that sanctions were intended to resolve.
In the Syrian case, “sanctions have already exerted a high economic cost on the
population o f Syria, especially on vulnerable and poor people, and already lowered the
quality of life” (SCPR 2013; 63). Similar to the impact of financial sanctions on Iran, the
difficulties of importing substantial goods and services due to the financial sanctions,
embargo imposed by several countries, and the currency depreciation have had a negative
impact on the livelihoods of people, including the lack o f imported essential medicine
and energy sources (SCPR 2013). In the midst o f all this suffering endured by the civilian
population, the sanctions have not brought the Syrian regime closer to a cessation of
violence nor has it altered the calculations o f its leaders. The sanctions have, however,
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helped to hinder Syria’s development progress as the population diverts resources from
productive to destructive activities.
Iraq is yet another instructive case o f the failure of sanctions to fulfill its specified
goal. The goal of the Iraqi sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council was originally
to inflict sufficient costs on Iraq’s economy to convince the regime to withdraw its army
from Kuwait. This episode serves as yet another example o f the failure o f sanctions, since
the Iraqi army did not withdraw until U.S. military intervention expelled it in 1991
(SCPR 2013). According to a report conducted by Dr. Mary Smith Fawzi for the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization, the sanctions on Iraq did not achieve its purpose,
however, it did inflict insurmountable pain the Iraqi people, the poor and disenfranchised
and is responsible for the deaths o f over 500,000 children under the age o f five. For this
reason, “the tendency to see economic sanctions as “below” the use o f military force on
some imagined ladder o f foreign policy escalation must be revised” (Haass 1997; 79).
Sanctions have historically been a prelude to war, not a tool to quell instability or
deescalate tensions.
These cases illustrate that sanctions weaken society and do not induce radical
factions or leaders to compromise on what they see as important domestic security and
economic imperatives. Economic warfare thinly veiled as diplomacy is not moving the
U.S. closer to their non-proliferation goals and therefore, alternative strategies that are
attentive to the internal political dynamics o f Iran must be formulated. In other words,
there is compelling evidence from these aforementioned cases to suggest that
comprehensive sanctions simply do not work.

61

Recommendations

While sanctions have shown little effectiveness, there is also no silver bullet
strategy available to dissuade Iran’s leaders from developing its nuclear technology,
whether for peaceful purposes or for weapons. Any strategy aimed at altering this
trajectory will inevitably fall short o f its goals. Negotiations would have to proceed from
recognition on the part of the U.S. that Iran does, in fact, have an unalienable right to the
peaceful use of nuclear technology. Article IV o f the NPT (to which Iran is a signatory)
specifies rights o f state parties to the treaty to engage in nuclear research geared toward
peaceful uses, such as power generation or production of isotopes with medical utility
(Bali 2006). As in all cases, and so with Iran, the costs or imperfections o f one strategy
over another can only be measured in comparison to the potential costs of alternative
strategies (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). The section below lays out a range o f possible
strategic options currently on the table for consideration as well as their counterfactual
implications, starting with the most ill-advised policy option to the more plausible one.

The Pre-emptive - Rollback Option

A preventive war waged against Iran would be a foreign policy mistake on a scale
that is unprecedented. Strategic thinkers tend to refer to the military option as a rollback
strategy, in which military force is used to topple a hostile or aggressive regime. The
Bush Administration was quick to judge this option as the most effective strategy at their
disposal following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Rollback strategies tend to
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be myopic in the sense that they fail to consider the domestic blowback and the possible
spillover o f the conflict into neighboring countries. It can be argued that the U.S.
currently employs are less extreme variation of this policy as rollback can encompass the
use o f diplomatic or economic sanctions in the hopes that such pressures will provoke the
demise of the targeted regime (Dueck & Takeyh 2007).
According to a 2012 report by the Federation o f American Scientists, the
estimated cost of a full-scale U.S. invasion on Iran could cost more than $1.7 trillion
(USIP 2012). Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. military intervention
would actually destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Targeted air strikes might delay the
program but such a move would ignite the revolutionary fervor that empowers the IRGC
and its conservative allies, as well as provoking a nationalist backlash that would justify
the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Many in the ranks o f the Revolutionary Guard believe
that regime change is the true motivation behind American action and confirming their
suspicion would make the prospect o f diplomacy a distant memory. As Kahl argued, “a
U.S. attack would likely rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners,
increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to
building a bomb” (2012; 171). In the event of a pre-emptive strike by the West, figures
like Khamenei would have little choice than to cede to domestic pressure and weaponize
its civilian nuclear program (CFR 2012).
Unfortunately, in Iran, the domestic costs o f making concessions outweigh the
international inducements presently available to incentivize cooperation. The prevailing
paradigm in Iran regarding diplomatic engagement is that negotiations are pointless
because any concessions on the Iranian’s part will lead to further impositions, weakening
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their position both internationally and domestically. Even the most valuable prize the
U.S. and its European allies could offer—normalization of relations and the integration of
the Islamic Republic into the world community— could conflict with the worldview of
dominant actors in Iran, specifically the IRGC, and undercut their power (Jervis 2013).
With the Revolutionary Guards behind the helm o f the most influential policy-making
institutions in Iran, any policy realignment toward moderation w ill presuppose their
removal from power. This expulsion from power w ill not come at the hand o f foreign
interlopers but rather from the competing domestic coalitions in Iran. The internal
dynamics of Iran will have a significant impact on the direction o f the nuclear policy. Of
course, these are rough approximations of the costs o f escalation, nevertheless, it is clear
that any type o f military escalation to the current standoff would not only be detrimental
to the U.S. but to the global economy as well.

Containing the Revolution

The U.S. has primary relied on a strategy o f containment throughout its turbulent
relationship with Iran. Containment generally requires deploying a military
counterweight around the state to be contained. While the U.S. accomplished this to a
large extent with its system o f bilateral alliances in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a
credible military threat plays into the narrative o f the Islamic Right, justifying increased
military spending and the harsh repression o f domestic competitors. Prolonging the
conflict with the West is an effective means for the IRGC and other radical groups to
rekindle popular support for the Islamic revolution’s fading elan (Dueck & Takeyh
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2007). In addition, a policy of containment and a policy o f engagement are mutually
exclusive. Using a strategy of diplomacy while reiterating the potential o f a military
reprisal for non-capitulation is like trying to negotiate while firmly planting a gun to your
counterpart’s head. It is counterproductive to consider making security assurances while
at the same time threatening security.
The harsh, warlike rhetoric o f the U.S. (spanning both the Bush and Obama
presidencies), Israel and other European nations plays into the narrative created by the
hardliner coalitions that there is a clear and present danger necessitating a nuclear
deterrent and fierce repression o f internal dissent. As discussed in chapters II and III,
threats, whether they are economic, military or rhetorical, produce a range o f unintended
consequences. One of the most significant consequences is the shift in power between
domestic coalitions. Rhetorical threats and restrictive measures solidified conservative
political hegemony over the domestic political and economic institutions o f the state.
In contrast, depriving the regime o f the notion that there are barbarians at the
gates (Coetzee 1980) or an exaggerated external enemy, the regime would no longer be
able to use diversionary tactics to frame their own economic mismanagement as an
international plot to undermine the legitimacy o f the regime. The notion o f institutional
reform would no longer be synonymous with treason or a ploy by the U.S. and internal
dissidents to topple the regime; but rather, something that is necessary to improve the
health o f the Iranian economy and political system. Hardliner groups in Iran already
believe that the U .S.’s primary aim is not the stabilization o f the region but the
weakening of the regime; therefore intensifying the military component o f U.S. policy
would only confirm their suspicions. Moreover, “adding still more sanctions now could
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make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of
the ultimate deterrent” (Waltz 2012; 2). Jumhuri-ye Islami, a conservative newspaper in
Iran, similarly noted that, “the core problem is the fact that our officials’ outlook on the
nuclear dossier of Iran is faulty... It seems they have failed to appreciate that America is
after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for them” (Dueck &
Takeyh 2007; 195).
For negotiations to be successful, U.S. non-proliferation policy toward Iran must
focus on the demand-side of the nuclear equation. In other words, what factors contribute
to Iran’s pursuit o f uranium enrichment? There must be some recognition on the part o f
the U.S. o f Iran’s regional context and its security concerns. “It must be emphasized from
the outset that for all the factions involved in this debate, the core issue is how to
safeguard Iran’s national interests” (Dueck & Takeyh 2007; 195). Therefore, Washington
needs to convince Tehran that negotiations are not designed to weaken its regional
position or a clandestine effort at regime change. To build this degree o f trust, the U.S.
must consider a strategic alternative to the present course, one that moves from how to
contain Iran to how to engage Iran.

Engagement through Integration

The sanctions regime threatens Iran’s bond to the global economy. In early
February, President Barak Obama signed into law a new round o f sanctions that aim to
further isolate Iran from the global economy by targeting its energy and media sectors
(Gallup 2013). “Instead o f helping to promote a developmental state whose behavior is
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moderated by the multi-faceted links created, the sanctions regime strives to sever those
links based on the claim that those links will eventually make the Islamic Republic a
better global citizen” (Fahri 2012b). Limiting Iran’s role in the global economy is no
doubt hurting legitimate businesses in Iran but economic isolation is being used to the
advantage o f hardline coalitions who are the principal architects o f the nuclear program.
For example, the regime manipulated the collapse o f the rial to empower the regime’s
closest allies, notably the Revolutionary Guards. The decline in the value o f the rial
equates to a reduction in foreign imports and the removal o f foreign companies from
Iranian markets. Since foreign imports are too expensive for the average Iranian to afford,
the consumption pattern o f the population has shifted from the purchasing o f foreign
goods to domestic products. Therefore, the domestic coalitions who wield dominant
control over the lucrative Iranian markets are the direct beneficiaries o f this stimulation in
domestic production caused by the financial sanctions.
The government and its revolutionary allies use their soaring profits to further
their redistributive and populist policies to gain the support of the poorest sectors of
society, who are typically the first to engage in collective action. Since 2006, rural
households have actually seen a rise in their median income per capita along with the
bottom 10% in the urban population (Salehi-Isfahani 2012). The use of cash transfers, as
a way to bring oil revenues to the dinner table, constitutes an important component o f the
regime’s extensive patronage network to retain the support o f the conservative rural and
urban poor. Meanwhile, under sanctions, the wealthier middle and upper classes, which
are generally liberal, experienced rising unemployment and political marginalization as a
result o f their waning economic clout.
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The removal of foreign companies means the removal o f competition and allows
for domestic companies to establish a monopoly in their respective markets. This
dynamic allowed for a reduction in transparency, an increase in corruption, and the
empowerment o f the coalitions who are well connected to the government. Companies
who rely on foreign imports or lack government connections, such as those in the
Reformist and Pragmatist camps, are left at a competitive disadvantage to their
revolutionary counterparts. According to Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, an expert economist
and former researcher at the Iranian Central Bank, these private sector businesses
currently owe the central bank over $17 billion in debt. The sanctions regime is
threatening Iran’s bond to the global economy, not only through the straight-jacketing of
the middle class and private sector, which is the promoter o f that bond, but also hindering
the point of view supportive o f economic integration (Farhi 2012b; 1).
Instead of severing Iran from the global economy, there must be an effort to
create more interdependencies so to increase mutual interests, communication,
information and possibly the spread of democratic values. “Continuity in relations
provides opportunities to assess the actions of others in order to reward good behavior
and punish uncooperative behavior” (Keshavarzian 2007; 16). Economic interaction is
desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems and benefits
extroverted coalitions who rely on international markets as a source o f their political
strength. Market economic reform also reinforces the development o f civil society. The
use of engagement as a strategy o f integration uses diplomatic and economic contact as a
strategy in itself in the hopes o f creating patterns o f cooperation, integration, and
interdependence between two hostile states (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). “After years o f zero
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relations and a torrent o f propaganda from both capitals, mistrust is endemic” (Economist
2013a; 36). In contrast, continuity o f diplomatic relations reduces uncertainty about the
preferences of others, and the accumulation o f precedents helps diminish bargaining costs
associated with transactions (Keshavarzian 2007). The lesson gleaned from the thought
experiment called the Prisoner’s Dilemma personifies the current stalemate between Iran
and the West on the nuclear file. In the absence o f transparency and communication,
cooperation is virtually impossible to obtain. Not only is cooperation impossible to obtain
under these conditions, but the uncertainty vis-a-vis the motivations and preferences of
the dominant actors creates a spiral o f insecurity (see Jervis 2009) that risks escalating
tensions to the point of no return.
Critics o f a strategy o f engagement through integration believe that it badly
underestimates the hostility o f most factions within the Iranian government toward the
U.S. (Dueck & Takeyh 2007). However, this critique does not take into consideration the
aforementioned fact that isolating Iran from international markets strengthens the
domestic factions most hostile to the U.S. while alienating their moderate counterparts.
Above all, the U.S. has a strategic interest in creating a good relationship with the
Iranian people, as the objective o f economic sanctions is to change the calculations of
Iran’s leaders, which necessitates the support o f the Iranian society. A good place to start
would be to stop threatening Iran. A positive step in this direction would be to remove the
sanctions that have done the most harm to the Iranian population. In the context of
Washington’s political gridlock, it would require more political capital than the President
currently possesses to repeal the oil sanctions on Iran. It would be nearly impossible to
loosen these restrictive measures as a way to entice Iranian cooperation because doing so
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would require the support of Congress, which favors a more confrontational demeanor
toward Iran. Under the current circumstances, it is unrealistic to believe that the oil
embargo is going away anytime soon. “Across a wide political spectrum in Washington
“compromise” remains a dirty word when it comes to Iran. Yet, as a bevy of
commentators and think-tank specialists urge the offering bigger incentives may be the
only way to persuade Iran to lower the diplomatic drawbridge” (Economist 2013a; 36).
In sum, the clenched fist policy toward Iran is counterproductive to U.S. goals.
The carrot should come in the form o f a relaxation on the financial sanctions imposed on
Iranian society. Reintegrating Iran into the global economy does not necessarily mean
that the U.S. must open its own markets to Iran; it would be an incremental process o f
loosening some of the more draconian coercive measures such as restricting specialized
medicines while encouraging U.S. partners to reopen trade relations with Iran.
This is not to promote a strategy of appeasement in which the U.S. makes
unilateral concessions in the vague hope o f obtaining Iranian cooperation. As chapter II
illustrated, the financial and banking sanctions exasperated a humanitarian crisis in Iran
that has reoriented public anger on the regime toward the West. The humanitarian crisis
effectively removes the ‘transmission mechanism’ needed to translate the suffering o f
Iranian citizens into tangible grassroots pressure on the regime. The financial sanctions
are responsible for the demise o f civic activism in Iran by destroying the connective
structures, the financial tools required for sustained collective action and by suffocating
the reform movement.
The culmination o f these factors offers an alternative narrative to Washington’s
claim that sanctions are effective in strangling the Iranian economy and therefore, likely
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to trigger the demise of the regime. A closer look reveals that financial sanctions are the
most counterproductive to U.S. interests. Loosening these sanctions could possibly
restore the Reformist and Pragmatists’ former economic primacy as well as domestic
balance o f power between moderate and hardline coalitions. In addition, President
Obama has a lot more latitude on financial sanctions than he does in regards to oil
sanctions. The President has discretion over removing or loosening the financial
sanctions, as doing so does not require authorization from congress. “Policymakers could
promise and deliver sanctions relief as a part o f the overall effort to build confidence,
induce gradual shifts in behavior, and reinforce contours o f a new relationship” (CFR
2012; 65).
The political costs of loosening sanctions can be managed because if this strategy
ultimately yields no positive results than new sanctions can always be reapplied.
Resolving the nuclear quagmire in the form o f the U.S. removing outdated economic
penalties, such as financial sanctions or restrictive measures imposed around the time of
the Iranian Revolution, could add over $60 billion in revenues to the global economy and
build the trust needed to come to a diplomatic solution. There is a common
misconception that economic sanctions are far less economically costly than war. In some
respects this is true. However, there are costs borne by U.S. businesses forced to forgo
commercial opportunities in Iran (CFR 2012). Another round o f U.S. sanctions on
transactions with Iran’s central bank could potentially cost the global economy billions of
dollars in lost revenue. If President Obama is serious about offering an extended hand to
Iran instead o f a clenched fist as he claimed in 2009, then putting an end to the financial
sanctions is as good a place as any to start.

71

Conclusion

This research set out to find a causal story to explain the impacts o f sanctions on
the political economy of Iran’s elite coalitions, which could be applied to similar cases
and help guide policy-makers on which course o f action would be most appropriate. In
Iran, these negative inducements have allowed for the strengthening o f introverted
coalitions as economic isolation has enabled them to further entrench their ability to
strengthen their monopolies, core protected constituencies, the military-industrial
complex, notably the Iranian nuclear program, and their tight grip on the levers o f state
power. At the same time, the impacts o f negative inducements have been much different
for extroverted elite coalitions, specifically the reform movement and its key allies.
Comprehensive sanctions coupled with military threats undermine these groups’ ability to
attract foreign investment and strengthen its ties to the international environment. These
conditions undermine the might o f extroverted coalitions who, derive their economic and
political power through greater integration with the global economy and are the advocates
of a conciliatory nuclear policy. In terms of the Iranian case and other instances in which
negative inducements are used, additional attention on the political economy o f the elite
domestic coalitions who influence the direction o f their country’s nuclear policy is a vital
consideration in determining how to craft negative or positive inducements, as well as
when their use will produce the desired outcome. Not only do current non-proliferation
strategies increase Iran’s insecurity and undermine the forces needed to initiate reforms
and moderate Iran’s foreign policy, these strategies play into the hands o f groups that
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have an interest in isolating the country from the global economy, thus making
denuclearization less likely (Solingen 2013).
This analysis illustrates the ways in which the impacts o f economic sanctions are
distributed unevenly across the political spectrum of Iran and other states. A s stated in the
introductory chapter, the domestic receptivity to external sanctions and inducements is
contingent on the specific attributes o f the domestic political landscape (Solingen 2012).
Positive and/or negative inducements must reflect the reality o f the domestic political
environment and be cognizant of the pressures and opportunities that exist for important
domestic elite coalitions. In instances where they do not accurately reflect the reality of
the domestic political environment, counterproductive, unintended consequences are
likely to manifest. According to Stein (2012; 47), for sanctions to be politically as well as
economically successful they must attack the bases o f state power, they must impose
costs on the elite and its supporting coalition (in this case the ruling elite is the
conservative traditionalists and their primary elite ally is the IRGC) and relatively
strengthen forces opposed to the government and its policies.
An underlying theme o f this thesis is that current U.S. policy instruments are out
o f alignment with policy objectives. The examples presented throughout the preceding
chapters have highlighted how the stated objectives o f economic sanctions do not match
the reality in Iran and elsewhere. The economic, social and humanitarian spillover of
negative inducements impacts the broader political environment in such a way that
strengthens the targeted state. If the U.S. continues to rely on negative inducements such
as threats o f war and economic sanctions to achieve their non-proliferation goals, Iran’s
level of receptivity and willingness to cooperate on the issue o f uranium enrichment will
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continue to diminish and events will continue to transpire in a way that is
counterproductive to U.S. policy objectives. Alternatively, as suggested throughout this
work, leading political figures in the Islamic Right have built fortunes and political power
bases around adapting to sanctions, so removing or loosening sanctions might actually
harm rather than help them (Jervis 2013). Depriving the Islamic Right o f an external
enemy will make the task of selling a radical foreign policy agenda increasingly difficult.
As economic conditions improve for ordinary Iranians so too w ill the possibility that
diplomacy will once again resume. Thus, policy-makers must seriously consider
grappling with the notion that the most relied upon diplomatic instrument in the U.S.
arsenal must be abandoned.
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